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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL NETWORKING AND  
SMALL AND MEDIUM FIRMS 
 
By 
 
Yeon-Sook Park 
 
 
 
     The three essays presented in this dissertation aim to investigate the relationship 
between industrial networking and the growth of small and medium firms in Korea. 
 
 
Chapter 1  Firm Size, Age, Industrial Networking, and Growth:  
A Case of Korean Manufacturing 
.  
 
The first essay investigates the relationships among firm size, age, industrial 
networking, and firm growth using the balanced panel data of 7,889 Korean 
manufacturing firms between 1994 and 2003. The result confirms Evans’ study in 1987 
that firm size and age have significant negative effects on firm growth and significant 
positive impacts on firm survivability. The primary issue of this study involves an 
investigation of the effects of industrial networking such as subcontracting and 
clustering on firm growth. Subcontracting is not a significant factor for firm growth 
and survivability. The subcontracting dependency rate is not particularly important to 
firm growth either, while more highly dependent firms are more likely to exit in the 
sub-sample of subcontracted firms. Clustering, on the other hand, significantly 
increases firm growth and survivability. However, there is no evidence that such a 
positive effect of clustering is derived from network externalities through competition 
and cooperation among firms in a cluster per se. Moreover, these positive effects of 
clustering disappear when omitted unobservable variables are considered by using firm 
fixed effects.  
  
 
 
Chapter 2  Subcontracting and the Growth of Small and Medium Establishments: 
Micro-level Evidence from Korean Manufacturing 
 
The second essay examines how subcontracting affects both the transformation of 
Korean industrial structure and individual firm survivability using the unbalanced 
panel data of Korean manufacturing between 1982 and 2002. A growing role of small 
and medium firms in the Korean economy for the past three decades is accompanied 
by the proliferation of subcontracting. Skeptics, however, argue that subcontracting has 
adverse effects on the growth of small and medium firms due to the extraordinarily 
high dependency rate and asymmetric negotiation status between large and small firms. 
The empirical findings suggest that the increase in subcontracting in Korean 
manufacturing contributes to a more small firm-oriented transformation in terms of 
employment and value added. The firm level analysis shows that engagement in 
subcontracting has a positive effect on firm survivability. However, totally 
subcontracted firms whose revenue is derived solely from subcontracting are predicted 
to have reduced survival rates compared to non-and less-subcontracted firms. 
 
 
Chapter 3  Riding into the Sunset: 
The Political Economy of Bicycles as a Declining Industry in Korea 
 
The last essay investigates the causes underlying the tragic story of the demise of 
Korea’s bicycle industry, from one that appeared to be as competitive as Taiwan’s up 
until the early 1970s to its almost complete dissolution and collapse. Whereas Taiwan 
went on to overtake Japan as the world’s number one bicycle exporter by 1980, 
Korea’s bicycle industry peaked in the late 1980s without ever reaching its maturity 
both in terms of export and production performance and then hopelessly declined to 
fall apart by the late 1990s. This paper examines three key causal factors: Samchuly-
Kia’s monopolistic complacency; Korea’s industrial structure and the assembler-
supplier relations; and the state’s unbalanced and big chaebol-biased industrial policies. 
In so doing, it contributes to rethinking and redefining the role of government and 
industrial policy in managing so-called sunset industries. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
To  
My Beloved Husband  
and  
My Worshiped Parents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Firm Size, Age, Industrial Networking, and Growth: A Case of  
Korean Manufacturing  
 
1 
 
 
1.1. Introduction   1 
1.2. Data  8 
1.3. Estimation Methodology   11 
1.4. Empirical Results   14 
1.5. Conclusion   22 
    Tables 25 
References 30 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Subcontracting and the Growth of Small and Medium 
Establishments: Micro-level Evidence from Korean Manufacturing   
 
33 
  
2.1. Introduction   33 
2.2. Data and Methodology    37 
    2.2.1. Data 37 
    2.2.2. Methodology 39 
2.3. Empirical Results (1): Subcontracting and Industrial Structure Change 43 
2.4. Empirical Results (2): Subcontracting and Firm Survivability  46 
2.5. Conclusion   47 
Figures 51 
Tables 52 
References 60 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Riding into the Sunset: The Political Economy of Bicycles as a 
Declining Industry in Korea   
 
62 
  
3.1. Introduction  62 
3.2. The Argument in Brief    65 
3.3. A Synopsis of the Bicycle Industry in Korea  68 
3.4. Samchuly-Kia in the 1970s: Monopolistic Complacency amidst the 
Company’s Shift in Business Priorities   
 
74 
3.5. The Industrial Structure and the Assembler-Supplier Relations 77 
3.6. The Making or Breaking Role of the State   80 
3.7. Conclusion  83 
Tables 85 
References 88 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
2.1 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by subcontracting dependency              51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1.1 Descriptive statistics 25 
1.2 Firm size, age, industrial networking, and growth   26 
1.3 Subcontracting dependency rates and firm growth: Subcontracted firms only 27 
1.4 Industrial networking and firm growth: Clustered firms only 28 
1.5 Firm growth rates of before and after clustering 29 
2.1 Distribution of employment in manufacturing by size class for selected  
countries, enterprises, 1999 or nearest year, in percent  
52 
2.2 SME shares of Japan, Taiwan and Korea in manufacturing, in percent  52 
2.3 SME shares in number of establishments, employment, and value added in 
manufacturing, 1963-2002  
 
53 
2.4 Descriptive statistics for selected variables  54 
2.5 Subcontracting, dependency, and size in SMEs  55 
2.6 Panel regression results for the shares of SMEs in sectoral manufacturing 
employment (EM) and value added (VA)  
 
57 
2.7 Panel regression results for the shares of young SMEs in sectoral 
manufacturing employment (YEM) and value added (YVA)  
 
58 
2.8 Impact on hazard rates (proportional hazard, Weibull distribution)  59 
3.1 Export and output levels of bicycles: Korea and Taiwan  85 
3.2 The breakdown of Kia’s aggregate sales by product lines  87 
3.3 The difference in industrial structure in the bicycle industry: Taiwan v. Korea   87 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
Many nice people have accompanied me in this intellectual endeavor. I would 
like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to them. 
 
     Professor Hun-Joo Park has provided me with the initial idea of this dissertation, 
leading me into the world of small firms in Korea. His in-depth knowledge on related 
literature and the emphasis on field research provided inspiration for this research and 
will be the guidance of my future study. Professor Tae-Jong Kim has been equally 
important in many ways. He extended my knowledge to various quantitative 
methodologies. His teaching and comments have been greatly instrumental throughout 
this dissertation. I would also like to thank Professor Byung-Joon Ahn who gave 
valuable comments. Thanks to him, this paper has become more interesting to read 
than previous drafts, without being too heavily inclined to quantitative analysis. I also 
wish to thank many distinguished professors at the KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management. Special thanks go to Professor Jong-Il You and Professor Jaeun Shin, 
who helped me go through some challenging courses.  
 
I have benefited enormously from the interviews from bright scholars sincerely 
thinking and acting for the future and development of small firms in Korea. They 
enriched my insufficient knowledge and experiences. I am thankful to the following 
researchers: Dr. Soon-Young Hong, Dr. Joo-Hoon Kim, Dr. Young-Sam Cho, Dr. Il-
Cheong Hwang, and Dr. Kap-Soo Kim. My special thanks must go to Dr. Dong-Kyu 
Choi, who shows me the great vision in terms of the direction in which small firm 
policy of Korea should proceed in the future. My deep thanks to President In-Ho Kim, 
Dr. Sung-Ho Choi, and other fellows in Korea Small Business Institute who give me an 
opportunity to work so that I can carry out what I have studied in school. Every 
moment with them is full of inspiration, learning, and fun. Many CEOs and field 
managers-in-charge related to this study have pleasantly accepted interview requests, 
and told me their own experiences and stories that I would never hear from anyone 
except from them. I express my gratitude to them as well. 
 
Finally, this dissertation would not be possible without my family support. My 
parents support me and show strong confidence whenever I have been depressed. My 
husband, Changduk, is always with me throughout this long journey. I do not know the 
way of expressing fully my thanks to him. This dissertation is as much mine as it is his.  
 
  
 - 1 - 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Firm Size, Age, Industrial Networking, and Growth:  
A Case of Korean Manufacturing 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The importance of small and young firms1 as a source of regional growth has 
been of interest to policy-makers for many decades. Numerous studies find that smaller, 
younger firms are more likely to grow faster than larger, older firms in terms of the 
number of employees, amount of sales or assets. In addition to firm size and age, a 
number of other characteristics such as innovation and export status have been 
investigated as determinants of firm growth. However, much less attention has been 
paid to the effect of industrial networking on firm growth. The primary issue of this 
study is to investigate the relationship between industrial networking and firm growth 
by using the balanced panel data of 7,889 Korean manufacturing firms between 1994 
and 2003.  
 
Previous Studies 
 
Many empirical studies on firm growth have been conducted as to whether 
“Gibrat’s law of the proportionate effect” is valid or not.2 In his salient book, Les 
Inegalites Economiques, Gibrat postulates that proportionate growth of firms is equal 
for all regardless of the size of firms in their initial stage (Gibrat 1931). As Sutton puts 
it, “the expected value of the increment to a firm’s size in each period is proportional to 
                                            
1
 In this paper, establishments, plants and firms are used interchangeably. 
2
 For details on Gibrat’s law and follow-up studies, see Sutton (1997). 
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the current size of the firm” (Sutton 1997, p. 40). This amounts to saying that the 
limiting distribution of tx , the size of the firm at time t , is lognormal. Although he 
presents empirical evidence to support his theory, empirical findings of this kind cast 
doubt on the idea that proportional growth rates are independent of firm size. 
Mansfield points out that Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect has been “tested only a 
few times against data for very large firms” (Mansfield 1962, p. 1024). With a broad 
range of samples of firms -large and small-, Mansfield finds that Gibrat’s Law does not 
seem to hold up very well empirically. For this reason, he suggests that “in every 
industry and time interval, the smaller firms were more likely than the larger ones to 
leave the industry” (Ibid., p. 1032). In addition, the variance of the size of a firm 
between time periods tends to be inversely related to its size of the beginning of the 
sample period. He concludes that “contrary to this version of the law smaller firms 
often tend to have higher and more variable growth rates than larger firms”(Ibid., p. 
1033).  
 
To explain empirical evidence contradictory to Gibrat’s law, Jovanovic provides 
the “learning model” which implies that firms learn about their efficiency over time 
with a Bayesian learning process. According to him, each firm has some level of 
“efficiency,” but it does not know what its relative efficiency is prior to entering. As a 
firm learns about its true efficiency level over time, “the efficient grow and survive; the 
inefficient decline and fail” (Jovanovic 1982, p. 649). His theory suggests that firm age 
might be inversely related to firm growth.  
 
The study of Evans (1987a, b) is of particular interest. He finds that firm growth 
decreases with firm size and age based on a sample of U. S. manufacturing firms 
(mainly small firms considered) between 1976 and 1982. He suggests that the inverse 
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relationship among firm size, age and growth are “robust to alternative assumptions 
concerning the effects of sample censoring and the functional form of the growth 
relationship” (Evans 1987a, p.657). Such a relationship is not due to sample selection 
bias as conjectured by Mansfield (1962). Jovanovic’s theory of the inverse relationship 
between firm age and growth is supported by Evans’ study. However, Jovanovic’s 
special assumptions to apply his learning model to Gibrat’s law fail to be proved. 
According to Evans, firm growth decreases with firm size either when it applies to 
mature firms or when firm age is held constant.3 Since Evans’ study, the inverse 
relationships among firm size, age, and growth have been well-established in a number 
of follow-up studies (Mansfield 1962; Jovanovic 1982; Evans 1987a, b; Hall 1987; 
McPherson 1996; Liu, Tsou, and James 1999; Lee 2002).4  
 
In addition to firm size and age, innovation has also been one of the most 
investigated determinants for firm growth. Previous studies reveal a positive effect of 
innovation on firm growth measured by variables such as the R&D conducting status 
and the R&D expenditure per employee (Mansfield 1962; Hall 1987; Yasuda 2005).5 
Other than innovation within an individual firm, the acquisition and spillover effects of 
knowledge through industrial networking have attracted policy attention as one of the 
significant resources of innovation. In some cases, long-term business relationships 
                                            
3
 Jovanovic suggests that under the special assumptions, Gibrat’s law still holds. According to 
him, if firm costs are Cobb-Douglas with decreasing returns to scale, firm growth is not 
relevant for mature firms. Under the assumption that the distribution of efficiency is 
lognormal, firm growth is independent of firm size for firms that entered at the same time. 
For a more detailed explanation, see Jovanovic (1982) and Evans (1987a). 
4
 By contrast, some studies find that Gibrat’s law holds empirically (Hart and Paris 1956; 
Simon and Bonini 1958; Lucas 1967, Sung 2000). In the study of Singh and Whittington 
(1975), the initial size of firms has a positive relationship with its growth rate. Das’ analysis 
(1995) on the computer industry in India is one of representative studies against Jovanovic’s 
theory.  
5
 Mansfield (1962) finds that “on the average the successful innovators in these industries 
grew about twice as rapidly as other comparable firms during the relevant period”. In terms 
of short-term growth, the rewards for successful innovation seem to have been substantial, 
particularly for smaller firms. 
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between firms involving activities such as subcontracting are regarded as an effective 
mechanism for small and medium firms to overcome their relatively weak knowledge 
status. In other cases, cooperative and competitive relations among groups of firms, 
organized in local community clusters, perform these functions. These positive 
externalities from networking among firms are expected to enhance firm growth.  
 
Most previous empirical studies on industrial networking focused on the effect of 
subcontracting on firm growth, albeit their empirical results are inconsistent. Yasuda 
(2005) studies the relationship between firm growth and subcontracting based on the 
data of Japanese manufacturing firms between 1992 and 1998. The result shows that 
subcontracting to only one customer company6 has a negative effect on firm growth, 
but not statistically significant. Meanwhile, subcontracting significantly increases the 
probability of firm survival. On the other hand, Wynarczyk and Watson (2005) find a 
significant positive relationship between growth and inter-firm partnership 
arrangements with members of their supply chain with the data of U.K subcontractors 
from 1993 to 1999. Developing particularly close, long-standing, and strategically 
important ties with other supply chain members contributes to the growth of firms in 
terms of sales and employment.  
 
The results of empirical studies on Korean firms are not much different from 
those of previous studies. Lee (2002) shows that firm size and age have negative 
effects on firm growth on the basis of the panel data of Korean manufacturing firms 
between 1991 and 2000.7 These findings confirm the result of Evans’ study, albeit his 
sample over-represents large firms. He also finds that R&D conducting firms or 
                                            
6
 Yasuda calls it “exclusive” subcontracting. 
7
 On the other hand, Sung (2000) demonstrates that Gibrat’s law and Jovanovic’s theory hold 
at the same time in the case of Korean manufacturing firms between 1993 and 1997.  
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affiliates of the top 30 chaebol8 firms are more likely to grow faster.  
 
Debates on Subcontracting and Clustering in Korea 
 
Of the various types of industrial networking, subcontracting and clustering are of 
germane interest in Korea. Subcontracting is the most prevalent networking form 
between firms: 61.2 percent of small and medium firms were involved in 
subcontracting transactions in 2004 (KFSB 2005). As Nugent and Yhee indicate, “for 
SMEs in countries like Korea that are rapidly moving up the technology scale and 
enforcing intellectual property rights, access to successful large enterprises and other 
firms can be an important means of overcoming the various constraints on their 
development, at least under the right circumstances” (Nugent and Yhee 2002, p. 102). 
According to the Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises conducted by KFSB, 46.0 
percent of subcontracted firms received technological support from the customer – so 
called the “parent company” – as of 2004 (KFSB 2005). The share of subcontracted 
firms that received the product design support from the customer accounted for 37.5 
percent. Management and finance-supported firms were 16.1 percent and 15.1 percent, 
respectively.  
 
Nevertheless, the expected positive networking effects from subcontracting are 
continuously controversial. This skeptical view is mainly derived from extraordinarily 
high dependent and exclusive relationships between big firms and small subcontracted 
firms. The subcontracting dependency rate measured as the share of the revenue from 
subcontracting relative to the value of shipments is almost 80 percent on average as of 
2004 (Ibid.). About 75 percent of all small and medium subcontracted firms rely on 
                                            
8
 Chaebol means big business conglomerates in Korea. 
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subcontracting for 80 percent of total sales (Ibid.).9 As for the relationship between 
subcontracting and firm growth, Song, et al. (2004) argue that relentlessly deepening of 
the downsizing trend of subcontracted firms is mainly attributed to excessive price-cut 
pressure from the parent company. A survey showed that 71.3 percent of subcontracted 
firms pointed out they had a difficulty because of price cut pressure from their 
customers (KFSB 2005).10 According to them, such pressure forces subcontracted 
firms to increase re-subcontracting to smaller firms and this deteriorates their profit 
rate compared with that of large firms.11 In an interview with one of the most 
renowned skeptics on subcontracting, the researcher argued that the government policy 
supporting small firms tied in cooperation with the local large firms might impede the 
growth of SMEs under the system where a very small number of large firms dominated 
the market. Instead, he suggested, “it would be more effective when the government 
supports independent and innovative firms capable of surviving to compete and grow 
in the global market.”12  
 
Evidence that clustering facilitates the performance of small and medium firms 
has been found around the world including the examples of the Third Italy and the 
Silicon Valley. In East Asia, Japan and Taiwan are also renowned for their well-
developed clusters in developing their economies based on the role of networked 
innovative small firms. Networked firms in a cluster are expected to enhance learning, 
                                            
9
 The dependency rate of subcontracted firms has been gradually diminishing recently. In 2002, 
the average dependency rate of subcontracted firms was 81.6% and firms whose dependency 
rate was more than 80% accounted for 79.7% of all subcontracted firms (KFSB 2003).   
10
 As for other difficulties in relation to subcontracting transactions, the survey respondents 
stated that they received irregular and unexpected orders (47.2%) and sudden delivery terms 
curtailment (39.2%).  
11
 In 2004, more than half of subcontracted firms turned out to re-subcontract partly or totally 
their work to other firms (KFSB 2005). The gap between big firms and SMEs in terms of the 
profit rate and productivity has become wider (Ibid.). 
12
 Author’s interview with a researcher in Seoul, Korea, on December 22, 2004. 
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increase flexibly to respond to changing circumstances, and achieve easy and open 
exchanges of information, thereby enhancing the potential for firm growth. As Chen 
puts it, “the secrets of industry are in the air” (Chen 2002): The information about 
business opportunities, innovation, and incremental improvement in products or 
processes circulates rapidly in industrial districts. 
 
No one can deny the role of industrial complexes in Korea. The number of 
industrial complexes in Korea was 578 as of 2005 (Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Energy and Korea Industrial Complex Corporation 2005). There were over forty 
thousand firms and about 1 million employees working in these industrial complexes 
(Ibid.). According to the Industrial Census, 22.9 percent of all manufacturing firms 
were located in industrial complexes and 56.8 percent of the value of shipments was 
produced by them in 2003 (Korea National Statistical Office 2004). Nevertheless, the 
concept of the industrial complex in Korea is somewhat different from that in the Third 
Italy that has volunteering, mutually competitive and cooperative traits driven by 
networked small firms. Korea’s industrial complex originated from and evolved 
through one of the industrial policies steered by the central government. In its early 
stage, the industrial complex was designed to support exporting firms by means of 
mitigating their initial investment with various taxation support systems and by means 
of providing a well-established infrastructure such as transportation and water services 
(Seo and Park 2003). In this regard much research (Bok, et al. 2003; Cho 2005; Koh 
2004) concerns the fallacy of a central government-driven policy on the industrial 
complexes, indicating the lack of both spontaneous networking among small firms and 
a strong partnership with the local community. In order to verify previous debates on 
industrial networking and to better understand the role of industrial networking in 
Korea, this study presents econometric evidence on the effect of subcontracting and 
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clustering on firm growth using the Evans model (1987 a, b). 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
This paper finds that the well-established fact involving size, age, and growth 
relationships holds in the case of Korean manufacturing firms. Firm size and age have 
significant negative effects on firm growth and significant positive impacts on firm 
survivability. The primary issue of this study involves an investigation of industrial 
networking such as subcontracting and clustering on firm growth. Subcontracting is 
not a significant factor for firm growth and survivability. The subcontracting 
dependency rate is not particularly important to firm growth either, while more highly 
dependent firms are more likely to exit in the sub-sample of subcontracted firms. 
Clustering, on the other hand, significantly increases firm growth and survivability. 
However, there is no evidence that such a positive effect of clustering is derived from 
network externalities through competition and cooperation among firms in a cluster per 
se. Moreover, these positive effects of clustering disappear when omitted unobservable 
variables are considered by using firm fixed effects.  
 
This study is comprised of five sections. Section II and III explain the data and 
methodology used in this study. The results of the selectivity-corrected maximum 
likelihood estimation are presented in section IV. The last section concludes the paper 
by discussing policy implications and limitations. 
 
1.2. Data 
 
The primary data for firm growth is the balanced panel for 7,889 Korean 
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manufacturing firms observed both in 1994 and in 2003.13 Regarding the estimation 
for firm survivability, the unbalanced panel data of 91,372 firms observed in 1994 is 
used. The data set of this study is extracted from the Report on Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey. This survey is annually conducted by the Korea National 
Statistical Office on manufacturing establishments whose number of employees is 5 or 
more.  
 
The survey includes a variety of information such as paid-up capital, opening year, 
number of employees, value of shipments and value added. As plant level data, it 
contains the information as to whether the plant has other factories belonging to the 
same company. The data from the survey also provides information as to whether the 
firm conducts R&D or not and whether it exports or not. Industrial networking is 
divided into two categories: Subcontracting and clustering. With respect to 
subcontracting, the survey has the data on revenue from subcontracting and cost for 
subcontracting. The definition of subcontracting in this survey is confined to the 
contract work that was done by a firm with materials provided by the parent company. 
Among various forms of clustering, it concerns only industrial complexes designated 
and managed under comprehensive plans by the central or local government.14 
 
Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics of key variables in the following two 
groups: Surviving firms observed both in 1994 and 2003 (surviving firms) and all 
firms observed in 1994 including exit firms up to 2003 (all firms). It is necessary to 
                                            
13
 For the purpose of protecting the information of individual firms, some data are not 
available by the Korean government. If a firm is the only one to run business of an industry 
in an administration district, the data on this company are missing. In order to secure as 
much data as possible, the 2-digit industry code is used instead of the 5-digit one of the 
Korea Standard Industrial Classification. 
14
 Refer to the Industrial Sites and Development Act. 
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point out the implication of “exit” in this paper. Usually, “exit” means the firm failed 
and disappeared during the observation period. However, in this paper, it additionally 
includes that the number of employees of a firm has shrunk below five.  
 
The average growth rate for surviving firms is larger than that for all firms, albeit 
negative in both groups. The growth rate is measured as the annual logarithmic growth 
rate of the number of employees between 1994 and 2003. Much recent literature 
adopts the number of employees as a measure of firm size. In addition, there has been 
increasing policy concern about the role of small firms in creating new employment. 
Over half of the firms recorded a negative growth rate. The percentage of negative 
growth firms among surviving firms (58.75%) is slightly higher than in all firms 
(55.23%). The standard deviation of surviving firms (.07), however, is as low as about 
one third of that of all firms (.20). 
 
The most conspicuous contrast between the two samples comes from the average 
firm size. The average number of employees of surviving firms is 72.08, while that of 
all firms is 32.05. The standard deviation of surviving firms (580.47) is also almost 
two and half times larger than that of all firms (221.54). In both samples, the number of 
small firms defined as having fewer than 50 employees is overwhelmingly large, that is, 
76.8 percent for surviving firms and 89.6 percent for all firms. Firm age is calculated 
by adding one to the number obtained by subtracting the year when the firm was 
established from 1994. Surviving firms (10.09) are older than all firms (7.82).  
 
With respect to industrial networking, the share of subcontracted firms among 
surviving firms (.24) is lower than among all firms (.29). In the sub-sample of 
subcontracted firms, the dependency rate is lower for surviving firms (.74) than for all 
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firms (.85). The dependency rate is measured by the ratio of the revenue from 
subcontracting to the total value of shipments. The share of clustered firms is twice as 
high in surviving firms (.27). The sub-sample of clustering firms, however, shows that 
the shares of subcontracting between clustered and non-clustered groups are not very 
distinct (.25 for surviving firms; .27 for all firms). The concentration ratio of the major 
industry within a cluster is just above 30 percent, not clearly different between 
surviving and all firms. The concentration ratio is used in this paper as one of the 
measures for the density of networking among firms in the same industry within a 
cluster. The major industry is determined by the highest concentration ratio, dividing 
the number of firms in the same sector by the number of all firms within the cluster. 
Here, industry is classified according to the two-digit Korean Standard Industrial 
Classification.  
 
1.3. Estimation Methodology 
 
The model that is used for estimation in this paper is based on the model of Evans 
(1987a, b) in which firm growth ( G ) is the function of firm size ( S ) and age ( A ). The 
regression model can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ttttt ASGttSSG υ+=−′−= ′ ,lnlnln                            (1) 
 
where t  denotes time with tt >′  and tυ  is normally distributed with mean 
zero and possibly a non constant variance and is independent of S  and A . More 
specifically, ( )tt ASG ,ln  includes the quadratic terms of firm size and age and their 
interactive term.  
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ttttttt ASASASG υββββββ ++++++= lnlnlnlnlnlnln 52423210   (2) 
 
This paper extends the Evans model into the model with variables for industrial 
networking and other firm characteristics. 
 
( ) tttttt IXNASGG νεδγ ++++= ,ln                                  (3) 
 
where tν is normally distributed with possibly a non constant variance. 
( )tt ASG ,ln  indicates the same regression model in (2) – that is the function of firm 
size and age including their quadratic and interaction terms. The key explanatory 
variable set is N , industrial networking dummy variables; subcontracting and 
clustering. The binary variable of subcontracting takes 1 if a firm conducts 
subcontracting and 0 otherwise. The clustering dummy takes 1 if a firm belongs to an 
industrial complex and 0 otherwise. The subcontracting dependency rate is used 
instead of the subcontracting dummy variable for a sub-sample of subcontracted firms. 
As for a sub-sample of clustered firms, dummies for subcontracting and the major 
industry are used instead of the clustering dummy. X  indicates a set of other dummy 
variables; the same company, exporting, and R&D. The same company dummy 
variable takes 1 if there are other factories under the same company and 0 otherwise. 
The exporting and R&D dummy variables take 1 if a firm conducts exporting and 
R&D, and 0 otherwise. The effects of the former two variables are considered so as to 
better understand other kinds of “linkage” effects besides subcontracting and clustering. 
The inclusion of the R&D dummy variable is for a comparison of the effect of 
innovation in an individual firm and that of a networked firm. Lastly, a set of industry 
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dummy variables, I , is included.15  
 
One concern of this model is the effect of sample selection on the growth-size-
age relationship. Since only firms observed both in 1994 and in 2003 are included in 
the data, the estimated parameter is likely to be biased. Table 1.1 implies that the exit 
rate may be closely related to beginning-of-period firm size, age, and other variables. 
For example, smaller and younger firms are expected to exit with higher probability 
than larger and older firms.  
 
The probability that a firm survives from t  to t′  is represented by the 
following selection function.  
 
( ) tttttt IXNASHSEL ιθης ++++= ,ln*                              (4) 
 
where *SEL  is a latent variable that is observed both in 1994 and in 2003. 
1=SEL  is observed if 0* >SEL . The error term ( tι ) is assumed to have normal 
distribution. Each variable set is defined as the same as that of the firm growth 
function (3) only with the exception of ( )tt ASH ,ln . As Evans suggests, in the 
selection process the relationships among firms size, age, and survivability are formed 
as linear. To estimate models (3) and (4), a sample selection model with the maximum-
likelihood estimator is used in this paper.  
 
In addition to the sample selection problem, the effect of heteroskedasticity 
should be taken into account. Heteroskedasticity is present whenever the variance of 
                                            
15
 In this paper, industry and sector are used interchangeably.  
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the unobserved factors changes across different segments of the population, where the 
segments are determined by the different values of the explanatory variables. For 
example, in the growth function, a heteroskedasticity problem rises if the variance of 
the unobserved factors affecting the growth rate increases with firm size. For this 
possibility, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for estimators are provided 
(White 1980). 
 
 
1.4. Empirical Results 
 
Firm size, age and growth 
 
Table 1.2 reports the selectivity-corrected maximum likelihood estimates. Model 
(1) shows the results of firm size and age without any other independent variables. The 
effects of the key industrial networking variables on firm growth and survivability 
with those of firm size and age are given in model (2). The effects of the remaining 
variables including the same company, exporting, and R&D dummies are presented in 
model (3) controlling for firm size and age effects. Model (4) shows the results of all 
variables in consideration of the industry dummy effects.  
 
In all four cases, the coefficients of size and age are consistent with Evans’ 
results only with the exception of model (4), and in most cases they are significant at 
the 10 percent level or higher. The coefficients of firm size are significant and negative 
in the growth rate function, while they are significant and positive in the selection 
function. Models (1) through (3) show that the effect of firm age on growth is 
significant and negative, whereas its effect on survivability is significant and positive. 
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After the inclusion of the industry dummy variables in model (4), however, the age 
effect becomes positive and not significant. It means that young firms relatively 
concentrate on new industries with high growth rates. The coefficient of firm age in 
the selection function remains significant and positive with the allowance for industry 
dummy variables in model (4).   
 
The quadratic terms of firm size have significant positive effects on firm growth, 
while those of firm age have significant negative effects on it. The interaction term of 
size and age is almost zero value and has nearly no influential effects on firm growth 
from models (1) through (4). It is not easy to directly grasp the effects of size and age 
on firm growth due to their quadratic and interaction terms. As Yasuda (2005) does, 
this paper forms the partially differentiated the growth rate function by size and age, 
respectively. Then it examines the signs of the values with the coefficient obtained 
from the estimation of models (1) and (4). The results of both estimations show that, in 
most firms, firm size and age have negative effects on firm growth. It confirms the 
results of most previous studies including Evans’.   
 
Subcontracting and firm growth 
 
Model (2) in Table 1.2 shows the result of the estimation adding the 
subcontracting and clustering dummy variables to the estimation of model (1). The 
coefficient of subcontracting in the growth rate function is almost zero and not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, subcontracting has a significant negative 
effect on firm survivability. The results are preserved after the allowance of industry 
dummies in model (4). The magnitude and significance of the coefficient become 
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weaker in the selection function, however.  
 
The above results are not always consistent with previous studies on 
subcontracting, especially on the relationship between subcontracting and firm 
survivability. Theoretically, one of the biggest advantages of subcontracting is 
business stability from the subcontracted firm’ point of view. This is mainly based on 
the fact that subcontracting is usually long-term and trust based. Empirically, the 
results can be viewed with skepticism when we consider that of Yasuda (2005). 
According to him, a subcontracted firm is more likely to survive than a non-
subcontracted firm.16  
 
Why is the outcome of this study different when compared with previous studies? 
This difference may be derived from the discrepancy in data and methodology of each 
of the different studies.17 One of the persuasive arguments to explain it can be the 
extraordinarily high subcontracting dependency rate in Korean firms, as indicated in 
introduction. In consideration of this point, a sub-sample that consists of subcontracted 
firms was made in this study and the estimation was conducted so as to figure out the 
relationship among the dependency rate and firm growth and survivability. The results 
are presented in Table 1.3. 
 
In all models (1) through (5), firm size has a significant negative effect on firm 
growth, while it has a significant positive effect on firm survivability. The coefficients 
                                            
16
 This result is also inconsistent with Song, et al.’s hypothesis that the subcontracting firm is 
less likely to grow due to excessive price-cut demand from the parent company.  
17
 The data of Yasuda is based on Japanese manufacturing firms with 50 employees or more 
and subcontracting firms for only one parent company. This paper, on the other hand, deals 
with Korean firms with 5 employees or more, and subcontracting is limited to the form that 
the parent company provides material for subcontractors.  
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of firm age are negative without industry dummy effects and positive with industry 
dummy effects. Both results are, however, not statistically significant. Compared with 
Table 1.2, the magnitude and significance of firm age coefficients decline in most 
cases of Table 1.3. Yasuda (2005) explains that having few age effects in a sub-sample 
of subcontracted firms might mean that a subcontracting firm will not be able to enjoy 
high growth in its early stage. On the other hand, firm age has a significant positive 
relationship with firm survivability in all models shown in Table 1.3. The interaction 
term between size and age has a significant negative effect on firm growth.  
 
Model (2) of Table 1.3 estimates the relationship between the dependency rate 
and firm growth controlling for firm size and age. In this dissertation, the second 
article entitled “Subcontracting and the growth of small and medium establishments: 
Micro-level evidence from Korean manufacturing” strongly implies that the 
relationship between the subcontracting dependency rate and firm survivability is non-
linear. It suggests that the growth-dependency relationship varies over the dependency 
rate distribution of firms. The dependency rate has a significant negative effect on firm 
growth, while it has a significant positive impact on firm survivability. The quadratic 
term of the dependency rate shows the opposite direction to its level form, that is a 
negative relationship with firm growth and a positive relationship with firm 
survivability. Both relationships are statistically significant. In order to figure out the 
effects of the dependency rate on firm growth and survivability, the same procedures 
are conducted as those for firm size and age of Table 1.2. As the result, most firms 
have a positive effect on firm growth, while they have a negative effect on firm 
survivability.  
 
After the inclusion of the industry dummy variables in model (3), the dependency 
  
 - 18 - 
 
rate fails to show a statistically significant relationship with firm growth, albeit the 
sign is negative. This indicates that more highly dependent firms concentrate on 
industries with a lower growth rate. Regarding the selection function in model (3), the 
effects of industry dummy variables do not change the direction of the dependency 
rate of model (2). The significance with industry dummy variables, however, becomes 
stronger than that of model (2). The result of the examination of the signs obtained by 
the partially differentiated selection function with the dependency rate shows an 
inverse relationship between them in over 90 percent of the firms.   
 
Models (4) and (5) examine the effects of totally subcontracted firms on firm 
growth and survivability. As expected from models (2) and (3), there are no significant 
relationships between the total dependency variable and firm growth. In the selection 
function, the total dependency variable has a significant negative effect on firm 
survivability, confirming the result of the second article of this dissertation. 
 
Clustering and firm growth 
 
In addition to subcontracting, model (2) of Table 1.2 shows the result of the 
estimation of the effects of clustering on firm growth and survivability. The result 
shows that the coefficient of the clustering dummy variable is significant and positive 
in the growth rate function. Moreover, clustering also has a significant positive effect 
on firm survivability. The result of model (4) shows that taking industry dummies into 
account does not change the result obtained in model (3).  
 
The significant positive effects of clustering on both firm growth and 
survivability are noticeable, considering the effects of the other variables on them. 
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Table 1.2 shows that the coefficients of most variables have different signs in the firm 
growth rate function and the selection function. For example, smaller and younger 
firms are more likely to grow faster, but less likely to survive than larger and older 
ones. The subcontracting dummy variable does not show statistically significant 
effects on firm growth, but a decrease in the probability of firm survival. These 
findings are consistent with a number of previous studies on clustering. As Porter 
(1990, 1998) points out, the geographical agglomeration of interconnected industries 
is expected to strengthen competition and cooperation among firms and thereby 
improve firm competitiveness. Putting it another way, clustering facilitates positive 
externalities through networking under the circumstance in which firms in the same 
and related industries, specialized suppliers, services, and associated institutions in a 
particular field are geographically adjacent to each other.  
 
Nevertheless, two concerns need to be addressed in examining the relationship 
between clustering and firm growth: One is for the origins of such positive effects 
from clustering; and the other is for econometric concern – the endogeneity problem. 
First, this study examines if such positive effects are derived from industrial 
networking per se. As briefly mentioned in introduction, the lack of voluntary 
networking among firms in Korea might have distinct features from those of the Third 
Italy or the Silicon Valley. To consider the skeptical views, estimation is conducted 
with a sub-sample of clustered firms. In order to examine the effects of networking in 
a cluster, this study adopts two explanatory variables: The subcontracting dummy as a 
measure of vertical cooperation and the major industry dummy as a measure of 
horizontal competition among firms.  
 
Table 1.4 shows the results of the estimation of the sub-sample of clustered firms. 
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Before analyzing the effects of the networking variables on firm growth and 
survivability, the relationships among firm size, age, and growth and survivability are 
examined first. In all four cases, firm size and age have significant negative effects on 
firm growth, while they have significant positive effects on firm survivability. It is 
noteworthy that the relationship between firm age and growth turns out to be linear. 
Such a difference might originate from the fact that firms move into an industrial 
complex almost simultaneously according to the Korean government plan.  
 
Models (2) and (3) show the effects of the subcontracting and major industry 
dummies controlling for firm size and age. Subcontracting is negatively related to firm 
growth and survivability, albeit not significant for survivability. Note that the 
allowance for industry dummies in model (4) changes such as the inverse relationship 
in the growth rate function becomes positive, but not statistically significant. The 
major industry dummy variable has a negative, but not significant effect both on firm 
growth and survivability as shown in models (3) and (4). As a result, the positive 
effects of clustering on firm growth and survivability may not be derived from 
industrial networking among firms.  
 
Secondly, although the sample selection bias is considered in this study, the 
omitted variable bias may still remain. Since firms choose whether to participate in a 
cluster, a positive relationship between firm growth and clustering could reflect 
characteristics of the firm that both increase the probability of clustering and increase 
firm growth. To control for omitted variables, this study restricts the sample to firms 
that have changed their clustering status at least once. Of 7,889 firms, 578 firms had 
changed their clustering status over the study period. These firms newly entered or 
exited a cluster one or more times. Table 1.5 shows the result of t-test of the mean 
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difference in growth rates between before and after clustering. The mean difference 
between them is 0.0012. The t-value for equality of the means is 0.1427, with the p-
value of 0.8866. In sum, the association between clustering and firm growth 
disappears when omitted unobservable variables are controlled for using firm fixed 
effects.   
 
The other factors: same company, exporting, and R&D 
 
The effects of the dummy variables of same company, exporting, and R&D on 
firm growth and survivability are shown in models (3) and (4) in Table 1.2.  
 
The same company dummy without the industry dummies in model (3) has a  
significant positive effect on firm growth, while it has a significant negative impact on 
firm survivability. The inclusion of the industry dummies in model (4), however, 
changes the sign of the coefficient of the same company dummy in the firm growth 
function. It implies that the firms with other factories concentrate on industries with a 
high growth rate. To sum up, the presence of other factories belonging to the same 
company is likely to decrease the probability of growth and survival considering the 
industry dummy effects.  
 
The exporting dummy has a positive relationship with both growth and 
survivability, but not statistically significant for firm growth. The result is not affected 
by adding the industry dummies in model (4), but with the industry dummies the 
significance in the growth rate function becomes stronger.  
 
Lastly, the R&D dummy, as pointed out in previous studies, is positively related 
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to firm growth and survivability. In all cases, the relationships are significant with the 
exception of the selection function in model (4). This implies that R&D activity 
involves high risks of exit but once an R&D conducting firm survives, it is more likely 
to grow faster than non-R&D conducting firms.   
 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
This paper shows some meaningful findings on the relationships among firm size, 
age, industrial networking, and growth as follows:  
 
First, firm growth decreases with firm size and age. Gibrat’s law does not hold, 
while Jovanovic’s law holds in the case of Korean manufacturing firms. By contrast, 
there are positive relationships among firm size, age and survivability.  
 
Second, subcontracting does not have statistically significant effects on either 
firm growth or survivability. In the analysis with the sub-sample of subcontracted 
firms, the subcontracting dependency rate has a negative, but not significant 
relationship with firm growth, while it has a significant negative effect on survivability.  
 
Third, clustering enhances a firm’s ability to grow and survive. The effects of 
subcontracting and the major industry in the sub-sample of clustered firms, however, 
are not statistically significant either in firm growth or survivability. Moreover, such 
positive effects of clustering disappear when omitted unobservable variables are 
considered by using firm fixed effects.  
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Korea is well known for its chaebol-centered development model. However, 
these close business ties among big conglomerates have been partly dismantled and 
restructured since the Korean financial crisis in 1997. Nevertheless, as Bok, et al. 
(2003) indicates, the fact that it is difficult for an individual firm to enhance and 
maintain international competitiveness raises policy concern for industrial networking.     
 
In the Korean context, this study suggests that clustering rather than 
subcontracting is more recommendable in enhancing the probability of growth and 
survivability. The findings of this research, however, show that such positive effects of 
clustering may not be caused by vertical and horizontal networking among firms.18 In 
addition, firm characteristics are very influential in explaining the relatively better 
performance of clustered firms. It is also noticeable that subcontracting with the high 
dependency rate has an even negative effect on firm survivability. As a consequence, 
policy interventions will be needed to address undesirable networking effects from the 
high subcontracting dependency rate, and to create a better environment for 
networking-based mechanism in a cluster. 
 
This study has some limitations in claiming that subcontracting and clustering in 
Korea does not have expected positive networking effects. Subcontracting in this study 
is restricted to the form of transactions conducted by a firm with materials provided by 
the parent company. In classifying the major industry in a cluster, this study fails to 
include interconnected industries that have forward and backward linkages. Further 
                                            
18
 According to a staff member of the Korea Industrial Complex Managing Corporation, 
positive externalities through industrial networking itself might be weak in the case of the 
Korean industrial complex. Nevertheless, comparative advantages of clustered firms 
certainly are derived from well-established infrastructure. He also mentioned that policy 
supports, mainly tax exemption and reduction benefits, played a role in firm growth and 
survivability in a cluster (interviewed on Feb. 16, 2006). 
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research needs to be done with industrial networking measures other than the dummy 
variables of subcontracting and the major industry. It also could be interesting to 
supplement the present statistical analysis with case studies of individual clusters, so as 
to suggest more precise policy alternatives. 
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Sample Surviving firms All firms 
(including exit firms) 
Variables Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev 
Growth rate     
    Overall -.02 .07 -.04 .20 
    Positive 41.25%  44.77%  
    Negative 58.75%  55.23%  
Size     
    Overall 72.08 580.47 32.05 221.54 
    Small(<50) 76.78%  89.64%  
    Medium(<300) 20.20%  9.35%  
    Big(>300) 3.02%  1.00%  
Age     
    Overall 10.09 7.60 7.82 6.60 
    Young(0~9) 59.36%  72.44%  
    Old(10~) 40.64%  27.56%  
Subcontracting     
    Subcontracting .24 .43 .29 .45 
    Dependency rate1 .74 .40 .85 .32 
Clustering     
    Clustering .27 .44 .15 .36 
    Subcontracting2 .25 .43 .27 .45 
    Major industry3 .34 .47 .36 .48 
Same company .05 .23 .03 .18 
Export orientation .21 .41 .12 .32 
R&D  .11 .32 .06 .24 
N (observations) 7889 91372 
 
Notes: 1. Subcontracted firms only 
2~3. Clustered firms only 
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Table 1.2 Firm size, age, industrial networking, and growth 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variables    (ID. dum) 
Growth rate ln(size) -0.063** -0.066** -0.064** -0.035** 
function  (19.34) (19.95) (19.58) (9.14) 
 ln(size)2 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
  (10.01) (10.05) (9.31) (7.73) 
 ln(age) -0.013** -0.013** -0.012** 0.003 
  (3.35) (3.31) (3.10) (0.81) 
 ln(age)2 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002+ 
  (1.97) (2.46) (2.05) (1.90) 
 lnsize*lnage -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.24) (0.41) (0.46) (1.32) 
 subcontracting  -0.000  0.000 
   (0.04)  (0.19) 
 clustering  0.005*  0.019** 
   (2.22)  (7.48) 
 same company   0.017** -0.013* 
    (3.80) (2.49) 
 exporting   0.003 0.006* 
    (1.25) (2.53) 
 R&D   0.015** 0.011** 
    (4.82) (3.84) 
Selection  ln(size) 0.268** 0.244** 0.278** 0.260** 
function  (47.23) (39.62) (40.60) (36.10) 
 ln(age) 0.136** 0.133** 0.136** 0.120** 
  (17.92) (17.14) (17.35) (15.22) 
 subcontracting  -0.089**  -0.030+ 
   (6.32)  (1.87) 
 clustering  0.203**  0.185** 
   (12.56)  (11.04) 
 same company   -0.319** -0.373** 
    (9.00) (10.57) 
 exporting   0.054** 0.054** 
    (2.83) (2.76) 
 R&D   0.064** 0.013 
    (2.62) (0.52) 
 ρ(rho) -.763 -.763 -.773 -.637 
 λ(lambda) -.069 -.068 -.070 .049 
 Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-14964.56 -14284.18 -14332.91 -13846.64 
 No. of obs. 91156 88350 88273 88273 
 Censored obs. 83278 80784 80708 80708 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.3 Subcontracting dependency rate and firm growth: Subcontracted firms only 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Variables   (ID. dum)  (ID. dum) 
Growth rate ln(size) -0.072** -0.069** -0.038** -0.071** -0.039** 
Function  (9.65) (9.40) (4.32) (9.59) (4.41) 
 
ln(size)2 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005** 
  (5.54) (5.42) (4.89) (5.57) (5.01) 
 ln(age) -0.007 -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.006 
  (0.95) (0.79) (0.77) (0.81) (0.75) 
 ln(age)2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.59) (0.52) (0.64) (0.61) (0.59) 
 lnsize*lnage -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
  (2.17) (2.48) (2.44) (2.30) (2.43) 
 ln(DRate)  -0.006** -0.002   
   (2.89) (0.75)   
 ln(DRate)2  0.001** 0.000   
   (2.61) (0.58)   
 Total dependency    0.004 -0.000 
     (1.08) (0.07) 
Selection  ln(size) 0.297** 0.281** 0.296** 0.275** 0.287** 
function  (25.08) (22.00) (22.28) (22.21) (22.29) 
 ln(age) 0.142** 0.134** 0.104** 0.130** 0.101** 
  (9.44) (8.78) (6.67) (8.54) (6.48) 
 ln(DRate)  0.036+ 0.047*   
   (1.66) (2.18)   
 ln(DRate)2  -0.016** -0.015**   
   (3.76) (3.57)   
 Total dependency    -0.177** -0.140** 
     (6.19) (4.49) 
 ρ(rho) -.808 -.807 .446 -.809 .479 
 λ(lambda) .093 -.075 .030 -.075 .033 
 Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-3865.137 -3845.004 -3734.695 -3843.591 -3734.374 
 No. of obs. 26572 26572 26572 26572 26572 
 Censored obs. 24678 24678 24678 24678 24678 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.4 Industrial networking and firm growth: Clustered firms only 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variables    (ID. dum) 
Growth rate ln(size) -0.051** -0.050** -0.051** -0.043** 
function  (8.55) (8.43) (8.55) (7.21) 
 
ln(size)2 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 
  (4.04) (3.86) (4.06) (2.71) 
 ln(age) -0.024** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** 
  (9.97) (10.09) (10.12) (10.40) 
 subcontracting  -0.006+  0.001 
   (1.67)  (0.19) 
 major industry   -0.005 -0.000 
    (1.26) (0.01) 
Selection ln(size) 0.183** 0.183** 0.183** 0.188** 
function  (15.43) (15.43) (15.48) (15.41) 
 ln(age) 0.141** 0.139** 0.139** 0.136** 
  (8.45) (8.28) (8.32) (8.12) 
 subcontracting  -0.042  -0.005 
   (1.38)  (0.15) 
 major industry   -0.040 -0.007 
    (1.45) (0.22) 
 ρ(rho) -.858 -.861 -.856 -.858 
 λ(lambda) -.087 -.087 -.086 -.084 
 Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-2836.442 -2831.344 -2832.319 -2737.14 
 Observations 13576 13576 13576 13576 
 Censored obs. 11532 11532 11532 11532 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.5 Firm growth rates of before and after clustering 
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Before clustering -.0011 .0062 
After clustering .0001 .0059 
Difference .0012  
No. of observations 578 578 
t-value .1427  
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Chapter 2 
Subcontracting and the Growth of Small and Medium Establishments: 
Micro-level Evidence from Korean Manufacturing 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In 1976 Korean small and medium manufacturing establishments (SMEs)19 
employed 44 percent of the work force and produced 30 percent of the total output. By 
2002 SMEs accounted for over 70 percent of the total employment and 50 percent of 
the total output. Among various explanations for the growth of SMEs introduced from 
the “SME re-emergence” debate20, subcontracting21 relationships of SMEs with large 
firms (LEs) is widely recognized as one of the major sources for the rising importance 
of SMEs in Korea, considering the features of the Korean economy in which the 
chaebol22 has dominated and more than 60 percent of the total SMEs are involved in 
subcontracting transactions. This paper aims to explore how subcontracting linkages 
between large firms and small firms and among small firms themselves affect both the 
transformation of Korean industrial structure and individual firm performance.  
                                            
19
 The official definition of SMEs in Korea as of 2005 is either the firms with fewer than 300 
employees or no more than total paid-in capital of 8 billion Korea Won or less. SMEs in 
this paper are consistently defined in terms of the number of employees based on the raw 
data of the Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey provided by the Korean National 
Statistical Office. Korea means South Korea, unless otherwise noted. In this paper, 
establishments and firms are used interchangeably. 
20
 For a comprehensive review, see Sengenberger and Loveman (1990).       
21
 In general, subcontracting refers to a contractual relationship in which a firm asks a 
different firm to conduct commissioned work (producing parts, components, or finished 
products). As main characteristics of subcontracting, the dominant position of the customer 
(often called a “parent company”) and long-term relationships are generally recognized. 
This paper uses subcontracting as a subset of general subcontracting, namely contract work 
that is done by a firm with raw materials provided by the customer.  
22
 Chaebol means big business conglomerates in Korea. 
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The growth of Korean SMEs is also noteworthy in terms of international 
comparison. Table 2.1 shows the state of Korean SMEs compared with the selected 
OECD countries (OECD 2002). With the exceptions of Italy and Japan, Korean SMEs 
had a higher proportion of employment in 1999 than the U.K., France and Germany 
who triggered the “SME re-emergence” debate. More interesting is that Korean SMEs 
had continued their growing trend in the 1990s when East Asia at large experienced an 
economic recession. As shown in Table 2.2, Japanese SMEs showed little change 
during the recession (Japan Small Business Research 2004), and in the case of Taiwan 
their sales amount dropped by 10 percent showing their downward tendency (Taiwan 
Small and Medium Enterprise Administration 2003). As for Korea, even the Korean 
financial crisis in 1997 failed to reverse its fast growing trend. Instead, SMEs were 
highlighted as an alternative for the further economic development in Korea, whereas 
the chaebol was severely condemned as a main culprit of the crisis. 
 
But this remarkable growth only provides half of the story in the SME debate in 
Korea. In spite of their continuing growth, until very recently Korean SMEs could not 
escape from their image of being backward, therefore, being excessively protected on 
the one hand, and being exploited on the other hand. With the emergence of skeptical 
views on the current state of SMEs, “polarization” and “dependency” have been 
considered as the Korean SME problems. In terms of the “polarization”, the gap in 
wages and productivity between SMEs and LEs has continuously widened since the 
1980s when Korean SMEs started their development. According to the statistics of the 
Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSB 2004a), with the wages and 
productivity of LEs set as 100, the wages of SMEs in 1980 turned out to be about 80 
and decreased to 66 in 2002. In the case of labor productivity based on value added, 
that of SMEs in 1980 was 55 and diminished to 32 in 2002 (Ibid., p.173). As for 
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“dependency”, some scholars point out that the protection with heavy financial 
assistance of the Korean government for SMEs is one of the causes of sluggish 
restructuring in SMEs (Kang 2004). 
 
A key to the pessimistic views on the growth of SMEs lies in the hierarchical 
subcontracting relationships ultimately headed by large firms. Subcontracting in the 
manufacturing industry has strikingly increased from 30 percent in 1980 to about 64 
percent in 2002 (KFSB 2004b), thereby becoming the most prevalent production 
network form between LEs and SMEs and among SMEs themselves. Skeptics indicate 
that almost 80 percent of subcontracted SMEs are the firms whose 80 percent of total 
sales rely on subcontracting as of 2002 (Ibid.). Another concern for them is the 
asymmetric negotiation status between larger firms and small firms owing to the 
exclusive and fully dedicated relationships among them (Song, et al. 2004; Hong 2003). 
 
Empirical studies are needed to examine to what extent these views on SME 
growth is grounded, especially the debate concerning the relationships between 
subcontracting and the current state of SMEs. Using data on 1,532,192 establishments 
from 23 industries between 1982 and 2002, this paper tries to explore the following 
two questions: (i) the influence of the increase in subcontracting transactions among 
firms on the change of the size distribution; and (ii) the impact – positive impact, if any 
– of subcontracting linkages on individual firm performance. 
 
This paper complements previous studies in two ways. First, it attempts to 
provide statistical evidence based on the long-term and micro-level panel data in 
examining the role of subcontracting in the development of SMEs. Most studies have 
dealt with subcontracting issues in a qualitative way on strategic industries such as 
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automobiles and consumer electronics with the aim of promoting the competition of 
the whole industry.23 The research on the limited scope of industries has its own merits, 
but it is an unanswered question as to whether such a study can provide general 
characteristics in other fields. Second, in analyzing the effect of subcontracting 
relationships on individual firms, this study subdivides firms into six groups on the 
basis of subcontracting dependency rates. Although Japanese success based on 
“relational contracting” in the automobile industry swept through the manufacturing 
world, research has been inconclusive concerning the relationship between 
subcontracting and the performance of a firm.24 The classification by subcontracting 
dependency rates can be a meaningful approach to partly solve those controversies. 
This approach is also very useful considering that the income of most subcontracted 
firms relies heavily on subcontracting transactions.  
 
This paper presents the fact that the increase in subcontracting transactions from 
either LEs or SMEs contributes to a more SME-oriented transformation of the Korean 
manufacturing industry in terms of employment and value added. On the other hand, 
the increase in subcontracting transactions from LEs may decrease the share of young 
SMEs in contrast to the effect on SMEs in general. It demonstrates that the 
subcontracting practice of LEs may work as an entry barrier to young firms in the 
sense that subcontracting is based on long-term relationships. As for the analysis of the 
performance of individual firms, the engagement in subcontracting has a positive 
impact on firm survivability. But totally subcontracted firms (TSF) whose revenue is 
derived solely from subcontracting are predicted to reduce survival rates compared to 
                                            
23
 Refer to Kang (2004). For broader empirical studies, see Hong (1993) and his subsequent 
papers; Choi (1995); Jang (1997); and Nugent and Yhee (2002). 
24
 For positive views, see Dore (1983); Nishiguchi (1994); Friedman (1988); Grabher (1993); 
and Powell (1990). For skeptical views, see Harrison (1994); Penn, Lilja, and Scattergood 
(1992); and Imrie (1994).  
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non- and less-subcontracted firms. 
 
Korea is an interesting case in terms of testing the relationships between big firms 
and small firms from the following three perspectives. First, Korea demonstrates a very 
obvious shift in the industrial structure toward SMEs as shown in Table 2.3.25 Second, 
subcontracting is the most prevalent practice in inter-firm business and big firms have 
served a core role in this practice. Third, Korea as an industrializing or newly 
industrialized economy can provide the arena for verifying and supplementing the 
existing theories and debates on the growing relative importance of SMEs, which have 
been done mainly in the developed countries. This paper is divided into 5 sections. 
Section II introduces the data and methodology. The outcome of the research with 
industry level analysis and firm level analysis can be observed in section III and IV. 
The last section concludes the paper by discussing implications and limitations. 
 
2.2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.2.1. Data 
 
The data is based on the Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey - the 
annual statistics for the manufacturing industry surveyed by the Korea National 
Statistical Office on establishments whose number of employees is 5 or more. The 
office has recently provided raw data on individual establishments.26 Even though the 
                                            
25
 Nugent and Yhee (2002) provide a more detail look of SME growth in Korea. 
26
 For the purpose of protecting the information of individual firms, if a firm is the only one to 
run a business of a particular industry in an administration district, the data on this company 
is not provided. In order to secure as much data as possible, 2-digit industry classification is 
used instead of a 5 digit one of the Korea Standard Industrial Classification. Nevertheless, 
the tobacco industry with the smallest number of firms is inevitably excluded from the 
industry level analysis since the range of missing data dramatically influences the 
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survey includes far-reaching categories, the information on subcontracting is very 
limited to the following two items: The revenue from subcontracting and the cost for 
subcontracting. The form of subcontracting is restrained to the contract work that was 
done by a firm with materials provided by the customer. As a measure of 
subcontracting dependency, the data is provided through the value of shipments. It is 
difficult, however, to observe measures that give information about the relationships 
with the customer. Value added and shipments are measured in millions of Korean won, 
deflated by producer price indices for the industry in which the plant is classified with 
the base year of 2000.  
 
The most frequently used data on subcontracting is from the survey on over 4,000 
sampled SMEs annually conducted by the Korea Federation of Small and Medium 
Business. This survey includes almost all subcontracting relationships such as ordering 
practices, delivered products, and profit-related information. The data of the 
relationships with customers is also contained. The Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade has conducted a survey on subcontracting centered on five 
strategic industries since 2001. The Small and Medium Business Administration and 
the Fair Trade Commission take an annual census of the state of subcontracting as well.   
 
This paper uses the Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey as its primary 
data set, since it makes the panel analysis possible, thereby providing a more concrete 
analytical framework, which simple pooled cross sectional data cannot. 27  More 
importantly, in the “core-ring production network” with big firms centered, 28 
                                                                                                                                
consistency of the value of variables.  
27
 Because of the difficulty of matching plant identification numbers in the survey, there is 
some error in allocating establishments to the continuers, exits and entrants, but we believe 
that this error is random and small.  
28
 For a more precise discussion on that issue, refer to Harrison (1994). 
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subcontracted firms with intermediate inputs are highly likely to belong to the group of 
“ring”. Whether the possession of technology would help subcontracted firms negotiate 
better transaction conditions is a still controversial issue. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to examine the impact of subcontracting on the weakest part of the production network. 
Table 2.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables. The basic information on 
subcontracting, the key focus of this paper, is found in Table 2.5.  
 
 
2.2.2. Methodology 
 
The industry level analysis 
 
Empirical analysis is conducted at two different levels. One is at the industry 
level and the other is at the firm level. The main purpose of the industry level analysis 
is to test the competence of subcontracting variables in explaining the intersectoral and 
intertime variations in the share of SMEs in sectoral manufacturing. With 21 sectors 
and 21 time periods, there are 441 observations on each of these dependent variables.29 
The dependent variables are the share of SMEs in sectoral manufacturing measured in 
terms of both employment (EM) and value-added (VA). Since EM, VA and most of the 
explanatory variables are measured in percentage terms, all relationships are specified 
in linear terms in this paper.  
 
Explanatory variables are divided into subcontracting factors and controlling 
                                            
29
 Remember that the industry level analysis in this study follows 2 digit-classification of the 
Korea Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC). The tobacco industry is excluded due to 
its missing data problem. The recycling industry having no large firm during the observed 
period is not included as well. 
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factors. This paper is designed to separately estimate the impact of the increase in 
subcontracting by LEs (SUBCL) and SMEs (SUBCS). They are measured by the 
shares of subcontracting expenditure in the total cost of LEs (SUBCL) and SMEs 
(SUBCS). This classification has a merit for catching an increasing trend of 
subcontracting linkages among SMEs from the 1990s. This distinction begins with the 
assumption that the subcontracting relationships between big firms and SMEs might 
have different features from that among SMEs. Two more explanatory variables to 
measure subcontracting effects are added. One is the share of the number of 
subcontracted SMEs in total SMEs (RSUB). The other is the share of the number of 
totally subcontracted SMEs in all subcontracted SMEs (DSUB) in an attempt to 
capture the impact of the degree of subcontracting dependency on the change of the 
size distribution. Subcontracting dependency is measured as the share of the revenue 
from subcontracting relative to the value of shipment. Totally subcontracted firms 
(TSF) are defined as the firms whose subcontracting dependency (s) is 100 percent. 
 
=s
 
Revenue from subcontracting/value of shipment 
 
Other variables are mainly derived from previous studies on the transformation of 
the size distribution. As macro-economic measures, the GDP growth rate (GDP) and 
the crisis dummy for 1997 and 1998 (CRISIS) are used. Industrial specific factors 
contain the market size (MSIZE), the industry growth rate (IDG), and the Cost 
Disadvantage Ratio (CDR). The market size is estimated by the ratio of each industry’s 
shipments to total shipments in a given year. The industry growth rate is calculated by 
the percentage differences in industry shipments in two consecutive years, measured 
for each of the two-digit industries of the Korea Standard Industrial Classification. IDG 
does not appear, therefore, in the first year of the study period. CDR, one of the ways 
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to predict economies of scale, is measured by the ratio of labor productivity (value 
added per employee) of LEs to that of SMEs.  
 
Newly entered firms whose age is less than 3 years (termed as ‘young firms’ in 
this paper) may play significant roles to the growing trend of SMEs. However, when it 
comes to subcontracting relationships, different features could be observed between 
young firms and SMEs in general. To explain the variations in the shares of young 
SMEs in terms of employment and value added, another set of dependent variables for 
young firms (YEM and YVA) is tested with the same set of regressors as EM and VA.  
 
The firm level analysis  
 
In assessing the performance of individual firms, productivity and profitability 
indicators are widely used. However this paper used survivability to measure 
subcontracting effects on firm performance. Survivability is a meaningful measure for 
this study not only because survivability represents ultimate and overall economic 
activities of a firm but also because one of the primary goals of the firm level analysis 
is to examine whether the growing subcontracting dependency leads to differential 
effects on firm performance. Since scholars generally acknowledge the positive 
relationship between subcontracting and survivability, it may provide a more useful 
tool to measure the effects of subcontracting dependency.  
 
In analyzing survival data, a duration analysis is more appropriate than a 
conventional regression approach due to length-biased sampling and censoring 
problem (Kiefer 1988). Among various methods to estimate the influence of 
explanatory variables on survival time, this paper starts with the Kaplan-Meier method 
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to visually capture the impacts of subcontracting dependency on firms' survival time. 
The proportional hazard model with the Weibull distribution is also used, considering 
that the baseline hazard ratio30 of individual firms is monotonically increasing over 
time.  
 
Explanatory variables are divided into two groups as in the case of the industry 
level analysis. Instead of macro economic factors and industry specific factors, some 
representative characteristics of individual firms are used: The subcontracting 
dependency dummies (SDEP), size class dummies (SIZE), shipment (SHIPMENT), 
labor equipment ratio (LER), and the location of an establishment (REG). The labor 
equipment ratio is defined as the ratio of tangible assets to the number of employees. 
REG indicates whether a firm is located in the capital area or not. The size class by the 
average number of employees, which is usually divided into one or two groups - small 
firms with 5-49 employees and medium firms with 50-299 employees – are classified 
into 5 groups (5-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-199, and 200-299). Most importantly, in 
evaluating the effect of subcontracting dependency on firms' survival rates, firms are 
divided into 6 groups (0%, 1~19%, 20~49%, 51~79%, 80~99%, and 100%) on the 
basis of s, the share of the revenue from subcontracting in the total shipment. In doing 
so, a closer look at the influences of subcontracting dependency is provided. In this 
study a ‘length of survival’ is defined as the duration that a firm keeps its employees 
between 5 and 299. In other words, a firm is classified as a ‘failure’ either because their 
number of employees has shrunk below 5 or grown above 299, or because it shuts 
down operation completely.  
 
                                            
30
 If the values of all variables are zero, meaning no influence of those variables on the hazard 
functions, the hazard functions of all firms become the baseline hazard functions.  
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2.3. Empirical results (1): Subcontracting and industrial structure change 
 
Table 2.6 shows the regression results for the shares of small and medium 
establishments in sectoral manufacturing in terms of employment (EM) and value-
added (VA). The models have been estimated in three different ways, namely by OLS, 
and by panel models with fixed effects and random effects. The multiple regression 
results for EM and VA are reported in the first column for EM and fourth column for 
VA. Unexpectedly, an increase in SUBCS is predicted to lower both EM and VA. The 
estimates derived from OLS may be subject to omitted variable problems31. In an 
attempt to address the problems, the fixed effects model (FE) and the random effects 
model (RE) are used.32 The results of the Hausman test show the superiority of the FE 
relative to RE in all cases. The Chi-square test statistics are listed at the bottom of the 
FE columns.  
 
With respect to subcontracting related measures, all six cases present that the 
increase in the share of expenditures on subcontracting to the total cost of either big 
firms (SUBCL) or SMEs (SUBCS) has significant positive effects on both EM and VA 
with some exceptions of the OLS estimation. For instance, a one percent increase in 
SUBCL may raise EM and VA by 0.188 and 0.332 percent respectively, according to 
FE. The signs of the SUBCS estimates are not consistent among the three models. FE, 
proven as the most superior model for this study, predicts significant positive impacts 
on EM and VA. The ratio of the number of subcontracted firms relative to that of the 
                                            
31
 Omitted variable problems arise when unobserved factors are correlated with any of 
independent variables. 
32
 To remove time-constant and unobserved attributes of the units being studied, fixed effects 
estimation is used. The random effects method is more appropriate if we can assume the 
unobserved effect (say, ia ) is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables ( itx ). 
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total SMEs (RSUB) has significant negative effects on both EM and VA. It means 
industries that have more segmented subcontracting transactions among SMEs may 
have relatively lower shares of SMEs in terms of employment and value added. It 
implies that items or processes of subcontracting are heavily concentrated on low value 
added conducted in smaller firms and there is a self-defeating price competition among 
subcontracted firms. Another possible explanation can be derived from the 
subcontracting practices by LEs. Subcontracted firms for LEs are, in general, larger in 
size and competent in technology, which makes it possible for them to provide 
materials for themselves and deliver finished products to LEs. The ratio of the number 
of totally subcontracted firms to that of all subcontracted firms (DSUB) shows 
negative (but not significant for EM) effects in FE.  
 
The estimates of economic variables are also meaningful since they suggest a clue 
for measuring the recession-push effects on the relative importance of SMEs. 
Economic growth may work favorably for SMEs by offering niches in the fast 
expanding market. On the other hand, a recession may be more advantageous to SMEs 
with relatively small fixed capital in terms of their dynamism. The results show that the 
GDP growth rate is negatively related to EM and VA, although it is not significant for 
either of them. The crisis dummy for 1997 and 1998 additionally increased in EM and 
VA by 0.078 and 0.099 percent respectively in FE, compared to all other years. In sum, 
a recession operates in a positive way for SMEs. The industry growth rate also has 
negative effects on EM and VA, indicating that the relative importance of SMEs has 
been more clearly observed in the declining industries such as the textile and footwear 
industries. However, this outcome is not statistically significant and the coefficient is 
the near zero value. The market size and cost disadvantage ratios also work 
unfavorably for EM and VA with the exception of CDR for EM in FE. 
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Another interesting issue concerning the role of subcontracting on the size 
distribution is whether subcontracting induces new entrants in the market. The 
supporters insist that middle managers laid off from big firms in the process of 
restructuring can play spin-off roles in establishing new companies subcontracted by 
those big firms. This is what has been obviously witnessed in the textile industry since 
the middle of 1980s. Another possible argument for the positive impact of 
subcontracting on young firms is that a subcontracted firm generally produces more 
specified products for the customer, which requires less initial capital for entry. On the 
other hand, the critics might point out that subcontracting is built on long-term and 
exclusive relationships between firms so it might take away the participation 
opportunities from young firms.  
 
Table 2.7 shows that young SMEs have clearly distinctive characteristics from 
those of the SMEs in general with respect to subcontracting. The estimates for SUBCL 
negatively influence YEM and YVA, showing contrasting results from Table 2.6. When 
large firms in an industry increase in their expenditure ratio on subcontracting relative 
to the total cost by one percent, YEM may decrease by 0.122 and YVA may be reduced 
to 0.158 percent. These results can be interpreted as showing that subcontracting 
operates as an entry barrier for young firms and LEs’ subcontracting practices are not 
generally open to outsiders. The effects of SUBCS are positive, albeit not significant. 
Other distinctive features of young firms are the estimates of RSUB and DSUB. They 
have positive impacts on young firms.  
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2.4. Empirical results (2): Subcontracting and firm survivability  
 
Figure 2.1 shows Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for subcontracted firms 
(subcat2&3) and non-subcontracted firms (subcat1). Among subcontracted firms, 
totally subcontracted firms are classified separately (subcat3). The graph indicates that 
the survival rates of the less dependent subcontracted firms (subcat2) are the highest,33 
followed by non-subcontracted firms (subcat1). Totally subcontracted firms (subcat3) 
present the lowest survival rates among the three categories. The peto-peto test statistic 
for equality of three survival curves is 2x (2)=2615.51, with the p-value of 0.0000. 
Despite the merit of Kaplan-Meier graph as a good way to see the basic shape of 
integrated survivor functions, it should be interpreted cautiously in the sense that it 
considers only one variable’s impact on the function, without controlling other possible 
explanatory variables that might affect survival rates. 
 
Table 2.8 presents the results of the proportional hazard model with the Weibull 
distribution. The listed numbers for explanatory variables are hazard ratio estimates. 
Unobserved heterogeneity such as each firm’s technology know-how and management 
skill is controlled in each case. Note that the ancillary parameter p is constantly larger 
than 1 and less than 2 (1<p<2), which means that the hazard rate increases over time at 
a decreasing rate.  
 
More specific segmentation on subcontracting dependency rates is included in 
explanatory variables. The results support what we found from the Kaplan-Meier 
                                            
33
 But, after 70 years of duration, the subcat2 group shows the lowest survival rates among 
three categories. This is in part due to either the relatively small number of the subcat2 
group or the higher possibility of the group to grow into LEs. The K-M survivor estimates 
for all firms including LEs show the consistently highest survival rates of the subcat2 group 
without any exception. 
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estimation. The hazard rates decrease as a firm becomes involved in subcontracting 
transactions with other firms. Compared to the non-subcontracted group (here SDEP1), 
at each survival time, the SDEP2 group (1-19%) decreases the hazard ratio by about 
10% according to the model (3). Put differently, the hazard rates for those firms who 
are involved in subcontracting with 1-19% of the dependency ratio is about 90% of the 
hazard rates for those firms who have no subcontracting linkages with other firms. The 
SDEP3 to SDEP5 groups also show lower hazard rates, although only the SDEP3 
group is statistically significant. Finally, the SDEP6 group whose revenue from 
subcontracting is the only source of shipments significantly increases the hazard rates 
in comparison with non-subcontracted firms. Totally subcontracted firms are in general 
exposed to greater risks because they do not have any alternative ways to diversify 
risks and most TSFs tend to heavily rely on a single customer. With respect to the size 
effects, the results show consistently that there is a negative (and highly significant) 
association between the firm size and the hazard rates. Shipment and labor equipment 
ratios decrease the hazard rates. The crisis dummy strikingly increases the hazard rates. 
Interestingly, firms located in the capital area show the higher hazard rates than those 
in the other regions.   
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The debate over the causes of the growth of SMEs and its assessment in Korea 
are in line with the “rise” and “lean and mean” discussion worldwide. From the “rise” 
perspective, Piore and Sabel (1984), in their book, The Second Industrial Divide, 
recognized the “flexible specialization” mode of production as bringing “possibilities 
for prosperity”, which refers to a technologically viable modern craft system in 
industrial districts clustered by small firms in the mid-1980s. In a number of follow-up 
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studies, the role of SMEs in the industrialized economies has been reassessed and 
highlighted as a new engine for growth, inspiring governments to place priority on 
SME promotion policies. 
 
Meanwhile, the skeptical views on the growth of SMEs have also arisen. Harrison 
(1994), one of the most famous critics of the “flexible specialization” theory, 
maintained in his book Lean and Mean, that small firms are “neither innovative nor job 
generators”.34 He insisted the SMEs’ relative growth originated from the change of big 
firms’ strategy in relation to their external relationships, not some spectacular growth 
of the small firm sector, per se. With respect to subcontracting, he argued that 
revitalization of the big firm sector was erected by reorganizing its production 
networks “in trimming its in-house operations to just its “core competencies,” farming 
out other work to rings of outside suppliers”(Ibid., p. 9). The advent of these “big firm-
led core-ring production networks” involves the growing inequality among workers as 
well as firms (Ibid, pp. 3~4). His argument is twofold. One is that the “lean” strategy 
of big firms leads to the relative importance of SMEs in the size distribution; and the 
other is that, as a result of the “lean” strategy, the state of SMEs is “mean” in terms of 
low job quality and effectiveness. Among his “mean” arguments, the inquiry of this 
paper is limited to an examination of the relationship between subcontracting and 
individual firm performance.  
 
The empirical results from this study support Harrison’s “lean” argument that the 
increase in subcontracting by large firms has resulted in the more SME-oriented 
transformation of the industrial structure. However, it fails to provide a unified answer 
to the question as to whether big firms’ “lean” strategy leads to the “mean” state of 
                                            
34
 See especially chapter 2 and 3 in Harrison (1994). 
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SMEs at the firm level. In contrast, the result from the duration analysis seems to 
oppose his “mean” argument, showing the positive effects of subcontracting 
relationships on firm performance measured by survivability. The only exception is the 
firm group whose revenue is dependent solely on subcontracting transactions.  
 
Nevertheless, when the results of analysis are interpreted, the following aspects of 
subcontracting practices need to be incorporated. First, as shown in Table 2.5, most 
Korean subcontracted firms belong to the category of totally subcontracted firms (TSF). 
This group of firms accounted for about 85 percent of all subcontracted firms in 2002. 
Second, the ratio of the number of TSFs to that of subcontracted firms has been on an 
increasing trend. The share of TSFs remarkably increased to 85 percent in 2002, from 
65 percent in 1982. On the other hand, the subcontracting ratio between 1982 and 2002 
showed relatively little change, staying at around 20 percent despite its increasing 
trend.  
 
Third, this growing share of TSFs may be intertwined with Korea’s own 
characteristics of the industrial structure in which over 90 percent of SMEs are small 
firms with fewer than 50 employees. Compared to medium firms, small firms are more 
engaged in subcontracting and show a higher ratio of totally subcontracted firms. 
Given the dual disadvantages, one from high subcontracting dependency and the other 
from small firm size, small totally subcontracted firms not only have to deal with 
challenges of asymmetric negotiating relations with subcontracting firms, but also have 
to struggle to keep from going out of business because of a loss of subcontracting 
relationships. 
 
Lastly, it is notable that the increase in the ratio of totally subcontracted firms is 
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hardly affected by the countermeasures taken by the Korean government in an attempt 
to diversify the sources of subcontracting. It is widely recognized that the Korean 
government played a major role in shaping and evolving the subcontracting system. In 
1982, the Korean government began to promote the systemization policy, which 
established a long-term contract system and deepened the relationships between the 
customer and subcontracted firms through heavy reliance on a single customer. Since 
the 1990s, however, there has been a major change of the government policy on 
subcontracting, guiding a more open flexible network form in an attempt to 
strengthening the competitiveness of the strategically important industries. The main 
policy-measures taken by the government include multiple ordering and inducing big 
firms to place orders with non-affiliated group subcontracted firms.  
 
Despite the merits of the data and methodology in this paper, it may be debatable 
as to whether the results of the study represent overall Korean subcontracting practices 
due to its limited definition of subcontracting. Subcontracting in this study refers to 
contract work that was done by a firm with materials provided by the customer 
according to the definition of the Mining and Manufacturing Survey. In the Survey of 
Small and Medium Enterprises, a more comprehensive annual survey on the state of 
SMEs by KFSB, the features of Korean subcontracting practices in general show 
patterns that are similar to the ones found in this paper: the subcontracting dependency 
rates have gradually increased over time; and the smaller the firm, the more likely it is 
to engage in subcontracting; and the higher the proportion of its income it derives from 
this. With respect to the measure for firm performance presented in this paper, it would 
also be interesting to compare the results from survivability with those of other 
measures such as productivity and profitability. A study on alternative measures is left 
for future research.  
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Figure 2.1 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by subcontracting dependency 
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Table 2.1 Distribution of employment in manufacturing by size class for selected 
countries, enterprises, 1999 or nearest year, in percent 
 
Country                     Size  Class 
      0-9 10-49 50-249 0-249 250+ 
Italy           12.8 36.3 23.2 72.3 27.7 
Japan 11.1 28.3 29.8 69.2 30.7 
Korea 10.5 29.9 26.4 66.8 33.3 
UK 9.4 17.9 25.7 53.0 47.0 
France 10.3 20.1 22.3 52.7 47.3 
Germany 7.4 15.1 23.2 45.7 54.5 
Source: Selected from OECD, Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook2002, statistical annex 
Notes: 1. Number of salaried employees for Italy; persons engaged for other countries.  
2. Enterprise size classes differ from the usual size classes for Japan (4-9) and Korea (5-9, 10-99) 
 
 
Table 2.2 SME shares of Japan, Taiwan and Korea in manufacturing, in percent 
 
 Year Establishments Employment Shipment Value added 
Japan 1992 99.1 71.7 51.9 56.7 
 2002 98.9 72.4 51.1 57.0 
Taiwan 1993 97.9 80.4(1999) 37(1994)  
 2002 96.7 79.4 27  
Korea 1992 98.6 65.8 45.7 47.6 
 2002 99.4 76.9 50.7 51.7 
Sources: Japan Small Business Research Institute (2004) for Japan; Taiwan Small and Medium 
Enterprise Administration (2003) for Taiwan; and KFSB at 
http://stat.kfsb.or.kr/menu1.html for Korea. 
Notes: 1. 4-299 employees for Japan. 
2. Enterprises, total paid-in capital of NT$80million or less than 200 employees; 
Shipments is replaced by sales for Taiwan. 
3. 5-299 employees for Korea. 
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Table 2.3 SME shares in number of establishments, employment, and value added in 
manufacturing, 1963-2002  
 
 Establishments Employment Value added 
 Number Share (%) Number (000s) Share (%) Won (in billion) Share (%) 
1963 18,073   98.7   267  66.4     32  52.8  
1970 23,406  97.1   422  49.0    156  28.5  
1980 29,779  96.6 1,000  49.6   4,168  35.2  
1990 67,679  98.3 1,864  61.7  31,432  44.3  
1997 91,324  99.1 1, 870  69.3  84,148  46.5  
1998 78,869  99.2 1,637  70.5  84,890  48.0  
2002 108,819 99.4 2,058  76.9  124,576 51.7  
Source: SME statistics at http://stat.kfsb.or.kr/menu1.html  
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Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics for selected variables 
 
Panel A: Industry level analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SUBCL 441 .0626 .0750 0 .4519 
SUBCS 441 .0926 .0783 .0005 .3540 
RSUB 441 .2265 .1629 .0170 .7497 
DSUB 441 .6144 .2216 0 .9828 
GDP 441 7.3286 3.7413 -6.9 11.1 
CRISIS 441 .0952 .2939 0 1 
IDG 420 12.7634 17.8339 -65.2567 133.5115 
MSIZE 441 .0471 .0315 .0012 .1939 
CDR 441 2.1967 1.2645 .6655 12.5738 
Notes: 1. SUBCL: [Cost of subcontracting/total cost] of LEs  
2. SUBCS: [Cost of subcontracting/total cost] of SMEs  
3. RSUB: Number of subcontracted SMEs/number of SMEs 
4. DSUB: Number of totally subcontracted SMEs/number of subcontracted SMEs 
5. GDP: GDP growth rates 
6. CRISIS: 1 if a year is 1997 or 1998 
7. MSIZE: [Shipment of the industry/shipment of the total industries] in each year 
8. IDG: Industry growth rates 
9. CDR: Value added per employee for LEs/that for SMEs 
 
Panel B: Firm level analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SIZE1: 5-19 1,532,192 .6856 .4643 0 1 
SIZE2: 20-49 1,532,192 .2062 .4046 0 1 
SIZE3: 50-99 1,532,192 .0676 .2511 0 1 
SIZE4: 100-199 1,532,192 .0307 .1726 0 1 
SIZE5: 200-299 1,532,192 .0099 .0989 0 1 
SHIPMENT 1,532,192 1948.3740 7684.5080 0 653490.9 
LER 1,532,192 28.4598 84.5037 0 35113.09 
REG 1,532,192 .5614 .4962 0 1 
Notes: LER is calculated by tangible assets per employee; and REG is 1 if the location of a 
firm is Seoul, Incheon, or Gyeonggi Province. 
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Table 2.5 Subcontracting, dependency, and size in SMEs 
 
Panel A: Incidence of subcontracting by dependency rates 
Dependency Number of SMEs Percent 
SDEP1: 0% 1,119,966 73.10 
SDEP2: 1-19% 52,291 3.41 
SDEP3: 20-49% 21,967 1.43 
SDEP4: 50-79% 10,395 0.68 
SDEP5: 80-99% 9,651 0.63 
SDEP6: 100% 317,922 20.75 
Total 1,532,192 100.00 
 
 
Panel B: Incidence of subcontracting by dependency rates and by size  
 
Dependency Small(5-49) Medium(50-299) Total 
SDEP1 1,001,043 118,923 1,119,966 
(%) 89.38 10.62 100.00 
SDEP2 37,182 15,109 52,291 
(%) 71.11 28.89 100.00 
SDEP3 18,825 3,142 21,967 
(%) 85.70 14.30 100.00 
SDEP4 8,789 1,606 10,395 
(%) 84.55 15.45 100.00 
SDEP5 7,693 1,958 9,651 
(%) 79.71 20.29 100.00 
SDEP6 292,794 25,128 317,922 
(%) 92.10 7.90 100.00 
Total 1,366,326 165,866 1,532,192 
(%) 89.17 10.83 100.00 
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Panel C: Subcontracting and dependency rates over time, in percent 
Year Non-subcontracted Subcontracted  
   Totally subcontracted 
1982 76.04 23.96 65.22 
1987 73.46 26.54 70.73 
1992 71.96 28.04 76.75 
1997 72.81 27.19 81.02 
1998 73.23 26.77 78.40 
2002 75.04 24.96 84.79 
 
 
Panel D: Subcontracting and dependency rates by the selected industries, in percent 
Industry Non-
subcontracted 
Subcontracted  
   Totally subcontracted 
Food and beverages 83.34 16.66 55.45 
Textiles  44.69 55.31 82.99 
Apparel and fur 47.42 52.58 91.26 
Publishing and printing 42.75 57.25 91.65 
Coke and refined petroleum 93.38 6.62 14.75 
Metal assembling 68.37 31.63 81.49 
Motor cars and trailers 78.70 21.30 60.98 
Recycling 91.13 8.87 58.21 
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Table 2.6 Panel regression results for the shares of SMEs in sectoral manufacturing 
employment (EM) and value added (VA)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable EM EM EM VA VA VA 
Estimation method OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Variables       
SUBCL 1.371** 0.188+ 0.222* 1.700** 0.332** 0.382** 
 (0.188) (0.108) (0.109) (0.185) (0.113) (0.115) 
SUBCS -0.792** 0.541** 0.512** -1.030** 0.436* 0.398* 
 (0.207) (0.179) (0.177) (0.203) (0.187) (0.186) 
RSUB -0.305** -0.165** -0.168** -0.325** -0.176** -0.180** 
 (0.091) (0.057) (0.058) (0.089) (0.060) (0.061) 
DSUB 0.128+ -0.058 -0.044 0.121+ -0.104* -0.085* 
 (0.067) (0.040) (0.040) (0.066) (0.042) (0.042) 
GDP 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
CRISIS 0.068 0.078** 0.076** 0.080 0.099** 0.096** 
 (0.069) (0.027) (0.027) (0.067) (0.028) (0.029) 
IDG -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
MSIZE -1.087** -1.383** -1.387** -1.461** -1.655** -1.667** 
 (0.295) (0.218) (0.218) (0.289) (0.228) (0.229) 
CDR -0.036** 0.042** 0.039** -0.080** -0.008 -0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-squared  1832.26   5438.13  
Prob>Chi-squared  0.000   0.000  
Observations 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.60  0.55 0.57  
Number of id  21 21  21 21 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.7 Panel regression results for the shares of young SMEs in sectoral 
manufacturing employment (YEM) and value added (YVA) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable YEM YEM YEM YVA YVA YVA 
Estimation method OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Variables       
SUBCL -0.022 -0.122* -0.108* -0.081+ -0.158** -0.146** 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.053) 
SUBCS -0.041 0.102 0.119 0.017 0.020 0.075 
 (0.049) (0.081) (0.073) (0.052) (0.089) (0.079) 
RSUB 0.018 0.099** 0.085** 0.028 0.145** 0.116** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027) 
DSUB 0.133** 0.009 0.039* 0.122** 0.014 0.051** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) 
GDP 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.001+ 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CRISIS -0.055** -0.037** 0.072** -0.063** -0.046** -0.053** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) 
IDG 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000+ 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MSIZE -0.268** 0.311** 0.166+ -0.258** 0.365** 0.171+ 
 (0.070) (0.098) (0.093) (0.074) (0.108) (0.101) 
CDR -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.006* 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-squared  39.74   39.71  
Prob>Chi-squared  0.04   0.04  
Observations 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.44  0.46 0.41  
Number of id  21 21  21 21 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 2.8 Impact on Hazard rates (proportional hazard, Weibull distribution) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SDEP2: 1-19% 0.770 0.911 0.902 
 (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
SDEP3: 20-49% 0.943 0.975 0.942 
 (0.024)* (0.023) (0.021)** 
SDEP4: 50-79% 0.991 1.009 0.971 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) 
SDEP5: 80-99% 0.932 0.961 0.952 
 (0.037)+ (0.037) (0.035) 
SDEP6: 100% 1.432 1.314 1.219 
 (0.012)** (0.010)** (0.009)** 
SIZE2: 20-49  0.774 0.730 
  (0.007)** (0.006)** 
SIZE3: 50-99  0.566 0.549 
  (0.009)** (0.009)** 
SIZE4: 100-199  0.370 0.377 
  (0.011)** (0.010)** 
SIZE5: 200-299  0.184 0.200 
  (0.010)** (0.011)** 
SHIPMENT  1.000 1.000 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** 
LER  0.996 0.997 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** 
REG  1.322 1.195 
  (0.010)** (0.008)** 
CRISIS  1.565 5.228 
  (0.012)** (0.124)** 
Industry dummy   Yes 
Year dummy   Yes 
/ln_p 0.469 0.388 0.285 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
P 1.599 1.475 1.330 
Observations 1123603 1123603 1123603 
Number of groups 298580 298580 298580 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Chapter 3 
Riding into the Sunset: 
The Political Economy of Bicycles as a Declining Industry in Korea 
(Coauthored with Hun-Joo Park) 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
What has motivated this research is the following puzzle: While the bicycle 
industry in Korea35 remained at least as competitive and promising as that in Taiwan 
up until the early 1970s, the subsequent development trajectories of the two have 
dramatically diverged since then. Taiwan went on to overtake Japan as the world’s 
number one bicycle exporter by 1980,36 but Korea’s bicycle industry peaked in the late 
1980s without ever reaching its maturity both in terms of export and production 
performances and then hopelessly declined to fall apart by the late 1990s.  
 
The premature collapse of Korea’s bicycle industry is also striking in comparison 
to the more normal development trajectories of Korea’s other labor-intensive industries 
such as textiles and footwear. Korea’s textile and footwear industries enjoyed no less 
prominent export shares of the US market than Taiwan’s through the 1970s and 1980s. 
Even after they became labeled as sunset industries, they kept making just as 
                                            
35
 Korea means South Korea, unless otherwise noted. 
36
 The number of Taiwan’s bicycle exports was surpassed by that of China’s in the mid-1990s, 
but it was Taiwanese firms in China that were responsible for the rise of China’s bicycle 
production. More importantly, Taiwan still kept its position as the world’s number one 
bicycle exporter in terms of total value output. Chen (2002), pp. 112 & 234. 
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considerable contributions to their nation’s economy in terms of exports and 
employment as was the case in Taiwan. As of 2000, for instance, the textile industries 
in Korea and Taiwan still accounted for ten and nine percent of the world’s trade share, 
respectively.37 
 
How then does one explain the puzzle? From a market perspective, like the new 
global division of labor approach, the “natural logic of the market” is supposed to 
explain the rise and fall of labor-intensive industries: The industries enjoy growth and 
expansion only as long as they keep labor costs down and maintain competitiveness 
(Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1981; Balassa, et al. 1982; Corbo, Krueger, and Ossa 
1985; Thomson 1998). Yet this systemic and international level approach cannot 
explain why the bicycle industries in Korea and Taiwan have taken radically different 
development paths.  
 
At the nation-state level of analysis, the dirigiste coalition politics approach 
provides a competing explanation that better captures why Korea and Taiwan have 
gone through different development trajectories that have respectively led them to 
maintain widely divergent industrial structures (Park 2001). The approach goes beyond 
developmental state arguments (Johnson 1982; Johnson 1987; Amsden 1989; Wade 
1990; Evans 1995) in examining the political causes underlying the variation between 
Korea’s weak and underdeveloped small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and Taiwan’s 
flourishing ones as the major employers and exporters. It contends that the variance 
comes from the differences in the two governments’ dirigiste development strategies 
and the formation of societal support coalitions. However, Korea’s choice of an 
unbalanced, big business-oriented development strategy falls short of perfectly 
                                            
37
 Korea’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy’s website at http://www.mocie.go.kr. 
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explaining the performances of its textile and bicycle industries which have varied in 
spite of the same national context. 
 
In order to fully understand the government-business and assembler-supplier 
relations at variegated industrial sectors, therefore, this paper not only moves further 
down to the industry-level of analysis. But it also goes beyond different variants of 
structural models (international structure or free market constraints) and various types 
of technocratic, developmental state theories. Both types have a strong overlay of 
determinism, but the development trajectory is actually not something predetermined, 
rather it is a result of choice of one set of possibilities (Park 2004). Building on the 
dirigiste coalition politics approach, therefore, the paper investigates how national 
development strategies are played out at the micro-, industry-level.   
 
By focusing on the industry-level social processes and institutions, the present 
paper contributes to rethinking and redefining the role of government and industrial 
policy in managing so-called sunset industries, perhaps an ever-increasing fact of life 
in the globalizing international economy. It goes without saying that focusing on 
Korea’s bicycle industry brings another analytical merit: the sunset industry offers a 
full spectrum of the life-cycle of growth, maturity, trouble and decline so that we can 
better assess the state-society interactions over the entire life-cycle. 
 
The next section outlines the key argument of the paper in brief. Section III 
presents a synoptic history of Korea’s bicycle industry. In an effort to understand the 
puzzling underdevelopment of Korea’s bicycle industry, section IV examines the 
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causal actions and motivations of Samchuly-Kia,38 the company at the center of 
bicycle manufacturing in Korea during the critical decades of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Section V looks at Korea’s industrial structure and the relationship between its bicycle 
assemblers and parts suppliers as another set of causes of the underdevelopment, while 
the section that follows investigates such causal factors as the role of the state in Korea 
and its big-push strategy of industrial expansion underlying the puzzle. Section VII 
reflects upon the causes and recaps the key arguments, drawing some policy 
implications. 
 
3.2. The Argument in Brief 
 
In Beyond Late Development, Amsden and Chu stress upscaling as the key to 
industrial upgrading: The continued industrial competitiveness and development of 
latecomers such as Taiwan and Korea presumably depend on how successfully they 
shift from mid-tech, if more labor-intensive, to high-tech sectors (Amsden and Chu 
2003, p. 1). Even in Taiwan, according to Amsden and Chu, the successful pioneering 
of high-tech industries in the 90s came not from its otherwise prominent networks of 
small, vibrant firms, but from large-scale, nationally owned companies (Ibid.). Since 
the technological level of many high-tech products often becomes “mature” by the 
time latecomers produce them for the international market, latecomers need big 
businesses to be able to exploit economies of scale and thereby to become second 
movers in the mature high-tech sectors (Ibid., pp. 7-8. emphasis original). 
                                            
38
 Kia (previously Kyongsong Precision from 1944-1951) was the official company name that 
produced Samchully bicycles from 1952-1978. Kia, which started its operation in 1944 in 
bicycle manufacturing business, began to invest its capital accumulated from the bicycle 
industry into its automobile manufacturing division starting in 1952. Samchuly separated 
itself from Kia and became an independent, exclusively bicycle manufacturing company in 
1979. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, however, by Samchuly this paper means Kia’s 
bicycle division, whereas by Kia it refers to Kia’s automobile division, unless otherwise 
noted. See Kia (1989). 
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To the extent that upgrading is upscaling, Korean industries in general have fared 
superbly and probably more dramatically and miraculously than any other country’s 
including Taiwan’s. Practically from scratch, Korea built up low-tech, light and labor-
intensive industries and then shifted to mid- and high-tech sectors in less than four 
decades. It did so chiefly by selecting a rather small number of big entrepreneurs who 
carried out developmental orders as agents of the state and in return received 
privileged access to investment credits and the largely monopolistic or oligopolistic 
domestic market. 39  For instance, the Korean government’s heavy and chemical 
industrialization (HCI) plan, which targeted six industries for investment (steel, 
petrochemicals, machinery, nonferrous metals, electronics, and shipbuilding), allocated 
a total of $9.6 billion investment capital for the HCI sector between 1973 and 1981 
(HCIPC 1973; Lee 1991). One can easily see the magnitude of the investment drive 
when compared to the country’s GNP of $10.6 billion in 1972. 
 
Upscaling surely constitutes one way to industrial upgrading, but only one 
possible way, and from the perspective of a national economy it offers a partial 
solution at best. It is so because regardless of the level of capital intensity or 
technological superiority, creating higher-value added is as important to industrial 
upgrading as upscaling. As Chen succinctly summarizes:  
 
high-technology industries also involve activities that utilize low technique such 
as repetitive assembly, and labor-intensive industries may include links that 
require sophisticated skills such as product design, prototype development, or 
                                            
39
 Even as of 1990, the share of monopolies and oligopolies in Korean manufacturing 
remained high at 81 percent in terms of number of products and 64 percent of total sales 
volume. Cha and Kim (1995), p. 397. 
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global logistics management (Chen 2002, p. 70). 
 
In fact, for instance, the districts of supposedly traditional, mature, and labor-
intensive industries such as apparel and footwear in Northeastern Italy and textiles and 
auto parts in Southwestern Germany continue to make significant and respectable 
contributions to the prosperity of their respective nations’ economies. 
 
Against such a backdrop, it is important to note that Korea’s heavily big business-
biased political economy has been sorely suffering from the persistent problem of a 
pronounced gap or imbalance in industrial competitiveness between big business 
conglomerates known as chaebol and low-tech, labor-intensive small supplier firms 
(See Korea Development Institute 2003). For instance, the share of the five largest 
companies in the country’s net manufacturing profits recorded 33 percent as recently  
as 2003, while the equivalent figure for all SMEs as a whole merely totaled 28 percent 
(Korea Development Bank Research Bureau 2004).40 As a consequence, it is not too 
surprising that the Korean system of political economy has been subject to recurrent 
instability. Korea’s 1997 economic crisis, which forced the nation to beg for a $58 
billion IMF bailout package, in fact, represented only the latest manifestation of the 
problem of faulted industrial structure (Park 2002). 
 
While Korea suffered negative GDP growth of 5.8 percent in 1998 in the wake of 
the 1997 Asian currency and financial crisis which spread like wildfire throughout the 
region, on the other hand, Taiwan escaped it largely unscathed, maintaining a healthy 
4.6 percent GDP growth rate even in 1998. The contrasting outcome of the crisis in 
                                            
40
 As another sign of the underdevelopment of its small suppliers, Korea imported 28 percent 
of input to produce one unit of output in 1985, as opposed to seven percent of input for 
Japan. Song (1990), p. 121. 
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Taiwan stemmed at least in part from the presence of its dynamic, export-oriented 
SMEs as well as its modernization strategy of sustaining macroeconomic stability, 
barring the rise of big private capitalists and practicing strict financial conservatism 
(Ibid.; Heo and Tan 2003). 
 
Reflecting the general strength of Taiwanese SMEs, even the country’s sunset 
industries have, in fact, done very well in industrial adjustment and rationalization 
even in the face of rapidly rising labor costs and local currency appreciation since the 
late 1980s. The bicycle industry in Taiwan, for instance, has remained highly 
competitive especially in high value-added products despite the rise of mainland 
Chinese competitors. Taiwanese bicycle firms have not only successfully eased 
resources out of the production of low value-added products by relocating them to 
China, but also maintained those of relatively high-tech and high value-added items at 
home. For instance, Taiwan remained the number one exporter to the United States 
bicycle market until as recently as 1994: in that year, Taiwan’s bicycle exports to 
America still amounted to over $323 million, controlling 62 percent of the market, 
which was almost double the amount of China’s total exports to the U.S (Chen 2002, p. 
117). By then, in contrast, Korea’s bicycle industry was practically melting down, with 
its bicycle assemblers shrinking to the status of mere merchants for the domestic 
market, and its parts and components manufacturers reaching a complete breakdown 
point. The next section summarizes the rise and premature fall of the bicycle industry 
in Korea. 
 
3.3. A Synopsis of the Bicycle Industry in Korea 
 
Much like its Taiwanese counterpart, the bicycle industry in Korea underwent an 
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import substitution stage in the 1950s, where the government prohibited imports of 
bicycles and some key parts to promote the local production of bicycles (See Chu and 
Li 1996). Although the Korean government started to promote an export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) policy in the early 1960s, neither the output nor export 
performance of the bicycle industry changed much through the 1960s, in contrast with 
the Taiwanese case where exports started to grow along with production figures in the 
late 1960s (See Table 3.1). The seemingly slight difference or edge that Taiwan began 
to have in exports over Korea in the late 1960s turned into a marked disparity in 
industrial performance by the 1980s. 
 
As detailed in the fourth section below, Samchuly as Korea’s predominant bicycle 
assembler was a prime example of the country’s failure to prepare its bicycle industry 
to face competition from the international market. Initially established in 1944 as a 
bicycle parts manufacturer which also primitively assembled some bicycles with 
recycled parts, Samchuly succeeded in the domestic production of Korea’s very first 
complete bicycle in 1952. Samchuly started to export to the U.S. in 1965, with its total 
export value to the U.S. reaching over $1 million by 1969 (Kia 1989; Bicycle life 2003, 
p. 112). Still, Samchuly remained too content with exploiting the domestic, 
monopolistic and highly profitable market to plunge into cutthroat export market 
competition. 
 
As a consequence, Samchuly failed to exploit the excellent export market 
opportunities of the 1970s to the full, in contrast to Taiwanese firms. Thanks in part to 
the expansion of the main customer base to include adults as well as kids and also in 
part to the oil shock of the 70s, in fact, the demand for bicycles in the U.S. market 
doubled from 5 million sets in 1970 to 10 million in 1973 (Chen 2002, pp. 83~93). As 
  
 - 70 - 
 
U.S. domestic production could not keep up with the increased demand, its imports 
increased by over 3 million sets during the same period (Chu and Li 1996, p. 40). 
Despite the dramatic surge in the US demand during the 1970s, however, Samchuly’s 
exports and thus Korea’s bicycle production grew only modestly (See Table 3.1).  
 
In stark contrast to the Taiwanese case, the Korean bicycle industry remained 
oligopolistic, if not monopolistic. A few late starters followed Samchuly, but the 
number of assemblers remained at around four at any given point in time. One of the 
two medium-sized assemblers that entered the market in the 1970s was Sunkyung, a 
chaebol which had accumulated its wealth in synthetic fiber and which was 
diversifying into other industries. The main reason why Sunkyung entered the bicycle 
industry by taking over a small bicycle manufacturer was to acquire one of the handful 
of lucrative general trading company (GTC) licenses from the government.41 Big 
business conglomerates scrambled for the licenses because the government offered the 
selected GTCs virtually unlimited access to extremely cheap export loans and 
privileged, exclusive rights to import certain, highly profitable products for the 
protected domestic market. In its bid to obtain a GTC status in 1976, Sunkyung not 
only had to meet the total annual export requirement of $100 million, but also carry at 
least seven manufacturing products of its own with an export value of over $500,000 
each (Lim 1997, p. 140; Kim 1987, ch. 4). Partly reflecting the so-called “birth defect” 
mentality, the top management of the Sunkyung group remained less than fully 
committed to its bicycle subsidiary and thus soon sold it to one of its employees; the 
off-loaded subsidiary had fizzled out by the early 1980s.   
 
                                            
41
 Authors’ interview with a former key Sunkyung employee who had been involved with its 
bicycle manufacturing subsidiary, June 18, 2004, Daegu, Korea. 
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Another challenge to Samchuly’s predominance came from Corex, which having 
been founded in 1980 became Korea’s second largest bicycle assembler by 1984.42 
Given Samchuly’s practical monopoly over the domestic market, Corex pursued an 
export-driven growth strategy. It started out as an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) after buying a bankrupt Japanese-owned bicycle manufacturer in the Masan 
Free Trade Zone, which had assembled Japanese knocked-down kits for the North 
American market. Corex differentiated its products from Taiwan’s low-end products by 
using higher-quality parts and components imported from Japan. In 1984, it became a 
star exporter of bicycles by landing a vendor contract with Sears’ department stores in 
the United States. Another huge boon to Corex came in the form of a joint venture 
offer from Murray Ohio in 1986, then one of the top American bicycle manufacturers.  
 
Thanks to the publicity and media exposure that Corex attracted, the Korean 
government and especially its Ministry of Commerce and Industry became highly 
supportive of Corex and the bicycle industry. The government helped the joint venture 
company with Murray Ohio set up a bicycle industrial district in Changwon, 
Kyungnam province, within which Corex’s joint venture established an assembly 
facility with a maximum production capacity of 2 million sets. About one-half of the 
district was designed to be allocated to bicycle parts and components manufacturers so 
that Corex could nurture and upgrade its own suppliers.43 Corex’s assembly line in 
Changwon went into operation on December 1, 1987, and in that year, Corex had 
already surpassed Samchuly as Korea’s number one bicycle exporter. Its 1987 export 
                                            
42
 The following section on Corex draws on the authors’ interviews with its officials at its 
headquarters in Kyunggi province, Korea, on November 27, 2003. 
43
 Although a sort of a bicycle industrial district was formed in Daegu in 1985 by Sunkyung’s 
initiative, the Changwon industrial district represented the first full-fledged one, set up in 
1987 to promote close cooperation between the assembler and its suppliers with the 
government’s full support. Samchuly followed the practice and tried to set up its own in 
Daegu in 1990. 
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figures jumped to 805,887 sets from 285,250 sets of bicycles in the previous year, 
while Samchuly’s 1987 exports recorded 509,873 sets.44 Ironically, however, 1987 
proved the beginning of Corex’s precipitous downfall. 
 
The June 29, 1987 declaration which allowed Korea’s first direct presidential 
election in 16 years, the onset of the subsequent process of democratization and the 
resultant explosion of labor unrest posed deep troubles for Corex’ management. As was 
more or less the case with other assembly firms in Korea, Corex ran on rather thin 
operating margins of no more than one to three percent of its total sales turnover. Thus 
the ten-plus percent hike in labor costs as well as the costly process of resolving an  
internal labor conflict issue, from which Corex had to suffer in the wake of the labor 
unrest, put quite a heavy financial burden on the company. 
 
Making the already bad situation worse, a far more momentous external shock 
came to Corex towards the end of 1988 while it was still reeling from its internal 
management problems: Murray Ohio had been sold to a British company in March 
1988, and in October 1988 its new management abruptly notified Corex of its complete 
divestiture from the joint venture. Corex desperately tried to survive the shock by 
restructuring and closing down the Masan plant, by shifting from a mass to a flexible 
production system of making more diverse products in smaller batches, by starting to 
sell its bicycles in the domestic market, and by diversifying beyond the North 
American market, especially into Western Europe with higher value-added products. 
However, the survival efforts could only go so far. Simply put, the rate of increase in 
Corex’s domestic sales could not make up for the rate of decrease in its exports. Then 
                                            
44
 Internal statistical data from the Korea Bicycle Industry Association (KBIA); authors’ 
interview with its officials on February 26, 2004 in Seoul, Korea. 
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there came yet another shock from the international market: With the rather abrupt and 
unexpected end of the General System of Preferences (GSP) in the European Union 
market in 1995— just as the already troubled Korean bicycle assembler turned to the 
region as its major export market, Corex could no longer benefit from the 17 percent 
tariff reduction as part of the GSP. When push came to shove with the 1997 financial 
crisis in Korea, Corex had no other option than filing papers for bankruptcy at the 
district court. 
 
In retrospect, Corex’s entry to the bicycle industry seems to have been rather 
belated— possibly by nearly ten years. For sound and long-term growth of the 
assembly industry, the presence of networks of vibrant and competitive parts and 
components suppliers was essential. Unfortunately, in 1980 or in 1986, Corex had 
neither such a blessing nor the wherewithal to nurture it. The company thought its joint 
venture with Murray Ohio would finally give it a sufficient economy of scale to 
develop and nurture competitive suppliers of its own. Corex’s rise, however, while it 
was indeed meteoric, turned out to be only short-lived.  
 
The fall of Corex practically ushered in the end of the bicycle industry in Korea. 
China had been fast becoming a new center of bicycle production since the late 1980s. 
Particularly the rush of cheap, imported bicycle parts from China to Korea began to 
drive the breakdown of Korea’s parts industry in the 1990s. Even such an established 
company like Samchuly, which at its peak had had 60 supplier firms under its own 
wing, had only 15 subcontractors by 2000. Those suppliers that were competitive and 
technologically equipped had shifted to other industries such as auto parts, and others 
had simply folded up. Those companies that survived merely produced either various 
replacement parts or such basic accessories as horns and plastic baskets. As of 2003, 20 
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bicycle parts manufacturers were registered with the KBIA, but our research found that 
only seven of them were barely eking out their livelihoods.45 
 
Samchuly itself had closed its factory in Korea by 2001 and established a joint 
venture in China to assemble bicycles for the Korean market. Its headquarters in Seoul 
only takes care of design, development and marketing (Bicycle life 2003, pp. 110~115). 
Corex, still reeling from the aftershocks of its 1999 bankruptcy, maintains a modest 
office in Kyonggi province and places OEM orders with China, which are also for the 
Korean market. Having failed to develop their own brand names or technological 
know-how to produce top-quality bicycles, Korean assemblers hopelessly degenerated 
into the ignoble status of mere merchants, solely depending on the lackluster domestic 
market. 
 
3.4. Samchuly-Kia in the 1970s: Monopolistic Complacency amidst the 
Company’s Shift in Business Priorities 
 
This section focuses on Samchuly in the 1970s, as the 1970s may well have been 
the critical juncture where Samchuly could have helped make a “slight difference” or 
create an advantage for the long-term development of Korea’s bicycle industry. As 
shown in Table 1 above, the bicycle output levels of Korea and Taiwan were on a par 
with each other at around a little less than a quarter million sets in 1970. By 1980, 
however, Taiwan churned out well over three million sets of bicycles, while Korea 
produced way below one million sets. The differences in export levels proved more 
revealing and momentous. In 1970, the bicycle industry’s exports in Korea remained at 
                                            
45
 Authors’ interviews with all of the major former and current bicycle assemblers and their  
suppliers from Fall 2003 to Summer 2004. 
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a meager level of four thousand sets despite its earlier development than that in Taiwan, 
whereas Taiwan’s export figures had already reached over one hundred thousand sets 
by then. After a decade, Korea’s bicycle exports numbered no more than 300,000 sets, 
while Taiwan exported almost three million sets (See Table 3.1). 
 
Samchuly’s predominance was unquestionable in the Korean market in terms of 
its superior technology, brand recognition, and market share. Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, it controlled over 65 percent of the market.46 Accordingly, Samchuly 
exerted an enormous influence on the KBIA. Chul Ho Kim, Samchuly’s founding 
owner, assumed the first presidency of the KBIA in 1953, and subsequently its CEOs 
or board members occupied the industry association’s key positions. Although the 
association was not as powerful as that of more export-oriented and prospering 
industries such as textiles, it stayed quite influential during the industry’s heydays by 
virtue of its government-mandated control over the right of export recommendation 
and entry barriers that effectively discouraged newcomers in the industry.47 Samchuly 
also enjoyed a firm and frequently exclusive control of its suppliers. 
 
Samchuly’s predominant market position surely came under the purview of the 
government’s so-called fair trade laws. However, the Price Stabilization and Fair Trade 
Act of 1975, as practiced, failed to prevent excessive concentration of economic power 
or abuse that stemmed from predominant market positions. The 1975 law enforced 
only its price stabilization part,48 and the bicycle industry represented no exception. 
The government tightly regulated the prices of bicycle products, but Samchuly could 
                                            
46
 Samchuly’s market share still reaches about 50 percent today. Bicycle Life (2003, p. 115). 
47
 Up until the 1980s, exporting bicycles required the industry association’s recommendation, 
the fees for which constituted the association’s main source of income.  
48
 Authors’ interviews with Samchuly officials on February 9, 2004, Seoul, Korea; Fair Trade 
Commission (1991). 
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still indulge in the oligopolistic, if not monopolistic, market and thus be content with 
its lucrative business of domestic sales. 
 
From Samchuly-Kia’s perspective, an even better and more promising investment 
opportunity lay elsewhere: automobile production. In terms of aggregate sales, as 
shown in Table 3.2 below, the company’s major products rapidly shifted from bicycles 
to automobiles from 1966. The share of the bicycle division plunged from 51 percent 
in 1965 to six percent in 1969, while that of the automobile division shot up from three 
percent to 57 percent during the same period. By the time the bicycle division 
separated itself from Kia in 1979, bicycle manufacturing accounted for only about one 
percent of the group’s total sales. The statistics on exactly how much of Samchuly’s 
financial resources had been funneled to Kia were not available, but many of our 
interlocutors concurred that the bulk of Samchuly’s investment capital had gone to Kia, 
incurring a huge opportunity cost problem for the bicycle manufacturing division in 
terms of investing in new technologies and production facilities.49 
 
Samchuly-Kia’s relative negligence of its bicycle manufacturing division also had 
a negative spillover effect on its parts and components suppliers. As some bicycle parts 
suppliers also produced automobile and motorcycle parts, the more competitive and 
technologically superior ones shifted their business focus to the latter. For instance, 
Kyungchang and Samrip used to be two of the largest and most successful bicycle 
parts suppliers, manufacturing brakes and headlamps for Samchuly, respectively. 
Starting in the 1970s, however, Kyungchang began to manufacture various cable 
systems for automobiles, while Samrip produced automobile lamps; now both 
                                            
49
 Authors’ field research from Fall 2003 to Summer 2004. 
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companies have long been out of the bicycle industry.50 
 
3.5. The Industrial Structure and the Assembler-Supplier Relations 
 
In addition to the problem of what Samchuly did or did not do, the differences in 
industrial structure constitute another critical factor in explaining the relatively low 
performances of Korea’s bicycle industry vis-à-vis Taiwan’s. As mentioned earlier, 
Samchuly enjoyed an almost monopolistic market in Korea especially during the early 
development phase of the industry, whereas Taiwanese bicycle firms lacked a sizable, 
let alone monopolistic or oligopolistic, domestic market to rely on (Chu and Li 1996, p. 
44). Nevertheless, the presence of numerous, robust, and especially export-oriented 
small firms better equipped Taiwan’s bicycle industry to exploit the United States 
market opportunities when they came in the 1970s. By making the most of the 
opportunity created by the surge in the market demand for bargain-priced imports, as 
noted earlier, Taiwan’s bicycle industry became a star exporter of the 1970s and went 
on to overtake Japan and claim leading position in bicycle exports by 1980. 
 
As Table 3.3 below shows, the number of firms in the bicycle industry in Korea 
essentially stagnated and declined. The total number of enterprises in both bicycle 
assembly and parts manufacturing sectors peaked at 89 in 1970, up from 66 in 1965, 
but it had declined to 67 by 1990. In contrast, the equivalent figure for Taiwan steadily 
and rapidly increased to 1,307 by 1991, up from 255 in 1966. On the other hand, the 
average size of the firm in Korea’s bicycle industry remained much larger than that in 
Taiwan’s. As shown in Table 3.3, for instance, the average number of employees per 
                                            
50
 Ibid.; see especially those interviews with officials at Kyungchang Industrial Corp. on 
November 26, 2003 and June 18, 2004 in Daegu, Kyungbuk province. 
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Korean firm varied between 40 and 50 from 1965-1990, except for 1970 or during the 
early 1970s. However, the comparable figure for Taiwan remained less than 27 
throughout the same period. Clearly, the bicycle industry was no exception to the 
general historical pattern of a divergent industrial structure between Korea and Taiwan: 
big business-based vs. small business-based.51 
 
The bicycle industry in Korea basically consisted of a small number of 
assemblers and their small or petty suppliers, and the great majority of these small and 
financially weak parts and components suppliers never attained sufficient economies of 
scale to gain necessary investment capital for significant improvements in technology, 
and quality standards, and so were unable to gain genuine independence from their 
vendor. Various estimates suggested that the industry needed a total production size of 
at least two million sets per year in order to develop and sustain a viable and 
competitive network of bicycle parts suppliers. 52  However, Korea’s total output 
volume, not to mention that of a single assembler, remained far less than the required 
minimum for the long-term development of the parts industry, with the exception of 
only a few, if belated, years in the late 1980s (See Table 3.1). 
 
Reflecting the general weakness of the bicycle parts suppliers, the relationship 
that they had with their assemblers remained largely exclusive and hierarchical. This 
seems to have been the case especially between market-predominant Samchuly and its 
                                            
51
 The same pattern existed in Korea’s other labor-intensive, so-called sunset industries such 
as textiles and footwear. In the textile industry, for instance, big firms with 300 or more 
regular employees accounted for almost 70 percent of total exports in 1984; in the footwear 
industry, such big firms accounted for 87 percent of the total value-added in 1981. KDI 
(2003, p. 547); Levy (1991, p. 154). 
52
 Authors’ interviews with officials at Alton Bicycle Co. on November 17, 2003 and May 19, 
2004 as well as with officials at Corex on November 27, 2003. See also Japan Cycle Press, 
(May 1985), p. 25; cited in Chu and Li (1996, p. 48). 
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suppliers. The average export ratio of Korea’s parts and components manufacturers 
amounted to less than ten percent even after the early 1980s, whereas their Taiwanese 
counterparts historically constituted strong exporters (Chu and Li 1996, p. 44). 
According to the available statistical data from the KBIA, as a result, Korea has always 
been a net importer of bicycle parts and components with the exception of 1985, when 
the total value of exports unusually, if barely, surpassed imports by less than a million 
dollars.53 With little export capacities of their own and thus weak bargaining positions, 
the parts suppliers in Korea did not have much choice but to depend abjectly on their 
respective assemblers; on the other hand, the assemblers, with their monopolistic or 
monopsonistic power frequently exacted compliance and subservience from their  
weak suppliers (Chen 2002, p. 136). 
 
During our interviews with bicycle parts manufacturers in their respective 
company offices, none of the interlocutors explicitly accused the big assemblers of any 
unfair trade practices.54 Most of them did not wish to express any bitter criticism of 
the way the assemblers treated them. Some of them even emphasized the mutually 
beneficial aspect of the relationship, which ensured that the suppliers could maintain 
basic profitability and that the assemblers could keep their costs of production down, 
barring extraordinary circumstances. Over dinner and drinks, however, many more or 
less acknowledged the existence of exclusive contracting relations between assemblers 
and suppliers. Samchuly in particular had taken advantage of its dominant market 
position and kept its parts suppliers more or less under its largely exclusive and 
relationship-ridden contracting practice. To be sure, the bargaining position of parts 
suppliers varied to an extent according to their competitiveness in terms of market 
                                            
53
 Internal data from the KBIA. 
54
 Authors’ interviews in Seoul and Daegu from Fall 2003 to Summer 2004. 
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share and technological level. But the fact that Corex, for instance, had to find and 
nurture its own domestic parts and components suppliers—apart from Samchuly’s 
existing ones—in its effort to reduce its dependence on Japanese parts suggested that 
the assembler-supplier relations in Korea tended to be lopsided, hierarchical and 
exclusive. 
 
Underlying the suppliers’ dependency upon assemblers was the role of 
government policy. As was the case with the automobile parts manufacturing industry, 
where the Korean government discouraged imports of assembled cars while allowing 
tariff-free imports of components (See Biggart and Guillen 1999, pp. 730~733), for 
instance, the government imposed different, if preferential, tariff rates on bicycle parts 
as opposed to those on complete bicycles. As of 1995, the tariff rate on bicycles parts 
was eight percent, while that on complete sets recorded 16 percent (see 
http://www.bicyclelife.net). Thus, the following section turns to the role of the Korean 
state in industry, as often the government’s role can make or break particular industries. 
 
3.6. The Making or Breaking Role of the State 
 
Chu and Li attribute the unsuccessful performance of Korea’s bicycle industry to 
the lack of a big push on the part of the government: Had the Korean state picked its 
bicycle industry as a target of its big-push industrial policy in the 1970s, the industry 
might have been as successful as Taiwan’s (Chu and Li 1996, pp. 49~50). The Korean 
government, however, remained too preoccupied with funneling financial and other 
resources to chaebol-based EOI and HCI projects to generate any significant policy 
support for SMEs in general or bicycle manufacturers in particular throughout the 
1970s. In its effort to achieve the nation’s rapid industrial transformation, the 
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government was just busy easing resources out of even such big business dominant and 
export-oriented sunset industries as footwear and textiles. It did so despite their 
continued, outstanding export performances: Although it peaked in 1970 at 41 percent 
of Korea’s total exports, for instance, the textile industry’s export share still remained 
at 11 percent as of 2001, compared to nine percent each for its automobile and 
semiconductor industry (Kim and Kim 1997, p. 324; http://www.mocie.go.kr). Against 
such a background, therefore, it was perhaps not at all surprising to find that scarce at 
best was the policy attention the government paid to the bicycle industry.  
 
However, it should be noted that the otherwise less market-interventionist or far 
less aggressive industrial policy-driven state of Taiwan made at least two crucial 
contributions to the successful development of its bicycle industry (Chu 1997, p. 66). 
First, from the early 1970s, it did set up and enforce industry standards for the quality 
control of bicycles for export, which helped its bicycle exporters to maintain 
international competitiveness by enhancing their product quality while keeping their 
costs low. Second, increasingly noting the R&D need for industrial upgrading, the 
government established the Taiwan Bicycle Industry R&D Center in 1991 in order to 
localize imported Japanese high-tech parts by improving the technological capabilities 
of parts and components manufacturers in Taiwan. 
 
The Korean government’s industrial policies became less unfavorable toward 
SMEs in the 1980s (Park 2001), and so did they toward the bicycle industry to some 
measure. In 1982-1983, for instance, it allocated 5.5 billion won for bicycle export 
promotion by way of strengthening its parts suppliers, subsidizing their R&D, fostering 
their specialization, and assuring an adequate supply of basic materials (Chu and Li 
1996, p. 49). Still, the Korean government’s bicycle industry promotion policy 
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remained rather meager and haphazard. 55  As discussed earlier, one noteworthy 
exception to this pattern was the highly effective policy support and assistance with 
which the Ministry of Commerce and Industry provided Corex in establishing Corex’s 
own industrial district for integrated bicycle production in Changwon in 1986. 
 
The government also launched the nation’s first bicycle racing in 1994, but the 
policy or enterprise has so far neither contributed to the revitalization of the industry 
nor stopped its helpless stagnation and utter decline. The KBIA had long advocated the 
introduction of bicycle racing since 1983 in an attempt to promote the industry in the 
way Japan had. While the annual profits from the bicycle racing enterprise now 
amount to 90 billion won, not even a single won has gone to benefit the bicycle 
industry directly.56  
 
By the late 1990s, lame duck firms were rife throughout Korea’s bicycle industry 
in general and its parts manufacturers in particular. With the rush of cheap bicycle part 
imports from China, Korea’s desperate parts suppliers filed an anti-dumping case 
through the KBIA. But the last-minute effort ended in vain in 2000 as the government 
remained far from willing to risk a trade dispute with China for the “dying” industry. 
Furthermore, the failure led to a practical dismantling of the KBIA: all but four 
assemblers withdrew their membership from the nation’s one and only bicycle industry 
association. 
                                            
55
 According to the authors’ interviews, few interlocutors were aware of, not to mention 
directly benefiting from, any governmental bicycle industry promotion policy. 
56
 17.5 percent of the profit gets accumulated to a fund for industrial development. But none of 
it has been used for the bicycle industry. The government has promised to funnel a part of 
the fund to the bicycle industry for its promotion starting in 2005, but virtually all the 
remaining people in the industry remain highly pessimistic, if not hopeless, about the 
possibility of reviving the nation’s bicycle manufacturing industry. Authors’ interviews with 
officials at the KBIA; the Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation at http://sosfo.or.kr. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
 
In explaining the rise and fall of Korea’s bicycle industry, this paper has 
examined three key factors: Samchuly-Kia, the industrial structure, and the state policy. 
Without looking at Samchuly-Kia’s monopolistic complacency and relative lack of 
export orientation at the industry level, one cannot fully explain the varying 
performances across such similar sunset and labor-intensive industries as Korea’s 
bicycles and textiles. However, what shaped the country’s monopoly or oligopoly-
oriented incentive and industrial structure, in which Samchuly-Kia operated, was the 
state’s unbalanced and big chaebol-biased industrial policies, which sorely limited the 
development of the bicycle industry, and ultimately gave rise to its permanent state of 
underdevelopment. Especially striking in comparison to the Taiwanese case were the 
Korean industry’s premature decline and the untimely demise of its parts and 
components suppliers, an outcome that was not in any way inevitable even for the 
small sunset industry. 
 
The small and labor-intensive industry vis-à-vis automobiles remained a blind 
spot to the Korean government’s industrial policy or targeting, and no chaebol 
entrepreneurs joined it except for Sunkyung (and then only marginally, but with an 
ulterior motive) and Samchuly-Kia (whose core commitment rather quickly shifted 
from bicycles to automobiles). The Korean government’s big-push strategy of 
industrial expansion in favor of heavy and capital-intensive industries throughout the 
1970s deprived especially the bicycle parts manufacturers of an opportunity to grow 
and make something of their own entrepreneurship. The big push industrialization 
program did not need to entail abandonment of the bicycle industry, albeit traditional 
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or sunset. In light of the successful Taiwanese experience with its own bicycle industry 
as well as the continued prosperity of districts of mature, labor-intensive industries 
such as those of Northeastern Italy, Southwestern Germany, and Western Japan, clearly, 
upscaling is not the only key to industrial upgrading even in the increasingly 
globalizing economy. The government’s sensible industrial policies may include easing 
resources out of declining sectors and promoting new, technology-and capital-intensive 
industries. Equally as important, however, is government policy aimed at helping 
existing industries to move up the value-added chain and enhance competitiveness 
through constant and incremental innovation in products and production processes. 
 
The tragic story of the demise of Korea’s bicycle industry, from one that appeared 
to be as competitive as Taiwan’s up until the early 1970s to its almost complete 
dissolution and collapse by the late 1990s, illustrates the importance of providing an 
equal or fair chance of success to small firms as well as big ones for long-term growth 
and health of the economy. In the state- and chaebol-dominant Korean economy, the 
mal-development of small parts and components supplier firms has been notorious, not 
to mention the lack of Silicon Valley-type small high-tech companies. The deleterious 
consequences of Korea’s relative lack of flexible, incrementally innovative, and higher 
value-adding small-scale businesses include the political economy’s recurrent 
instability, which was manifested most recently in the nation’s 1997 financial crisis. 
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Table 3.1 Export and Output Levels of Bicycles: Korea and Taiwan  
Unit: thousand sets 
Korea Taiwan 
Year 
Export Output Export Output 
1965 N/A 150 2 N/A 
1966 N/A 180 0 N/A 
1967 N/A 148 5 N/A 
1968 N/A 171 17 107 
1969 N/A 197 85 184 
1970 4 214 107 217 
1971 35 244 270 394 
1972 120 384 1,051 1,192 
1973 252 542 1,313 1,463 
1974 109 674 866 1,026 
1975 172 627 814 981 
1976 302 770 1,519 1,709 
1977 359 1,024 1,745 1,955 
1978 389 1,318 1,848 2,088 
1979 244 943 2,204 2,464 
1980 299 776 2,979 3,257 
1981 276 834 3,338 3,632 
1982 231 847 3,210 3,515 
1983 150 767 5,058 5,390 
1984 379 917 6,329 6,700 
1985 479 938 7,442 7,834 
1986 789 1,350 10,239 10,681 
1987 1,704 2,237 9,686 10,185 
1988 2,117 2,842 7,152 7,684 
1989 1,226 1,859 8,892 9,463 
1990 849 1,534 9,380 9,975 
1991 543 1,525 10,686 11,328 
1992 424 1,265 9,678 10,354 
1993 N/A N/A 8,621 N/A 
1994 N/A N/A 8,752 N/A 
    Continued 
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Korea Taiwan 
Year 
Export Output Export Output 
1995 284 1,045 9,064 N/A 
1996 156 835 9,503 N/A 
1997 119 762 8,826 N/A 
1998 139 619 N/A N/A 
1999 120 670 N/A N/A 
2000 75 658 N/A N/A 
2001 54 629 N/A N/A 
2002 38 624 N/A N/A 
Sources: Compiled from Chu and Li (1996, p. 41); The Korea Bicycle Industry Association (KBIA), 
internal statistical data; and Chen (2002). 
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Table 3.2 The Breakdown of Kia’s Aggregate Sales by Product Lines 
Unit: Percent 
Year Automobiles 
Motor-
cycles 
Bicycles Year Automobiles 
Motor-
cycles 
Bicycles 
1965 2.8 9.9 51.0 1973 66.2 10.6 10.1 
1966 21.7 13.7 46.3 1974 79.3 5.8 8.8 
1967 45.5 19.6 21.6 1975 85.7 4.4 5.9 
1968 48.2 29.9 13.6 1976 89.3 N/A 8.4 
1969 57.0 28.5 6.4 1977 92.5 N/A 7.5 
1970 58.3 24.0 8.0 1978 94.7 N/A 5.3 
1971 54.7 24.8 8.5 1979 98.6 N/A 1.4 
1972 58.9 15.2 13.1 1980 100.0 N/A N/A 
Source: Kia (1989, p. 263). 
Note: The motorcycle division established a separate, independent company in 1976. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 The Difference in Industrial Structure in the Bicycle Industry:  
Taiwan v. Korea 
 
Korea Taiwan Year 
No. of 
enterprises 
Avg. no. of 
employees per firm 
No. of 
enterprises 
Avg. no. of 
employees per firm 
1965 66 47.3   
1966   255 15.71 
1970 89 27.37   
1971   279 16.0 
1975 81 48.32   
1976   447 20.66 
1980 74 52.58   
1981   541 17.98 
1985 63 53.68   
1986   867 26.47 
1990 67 41.63   
1991   1307 23.45 
Source: Chu and Li (1996, pp. 42-43). 
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